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The buying and selling of people is a profitable business
because, while globalization has made it easier to move goods
and money around the world, people who want to move where
jobs are face ever more stringent restrictions on legal
migration. 1
[P]erhaps the most profound challenge of all will be faced by
citizens and policy-makers in migrant sending and receiving
countries. Inhabitants of the latter will have to move beyond
the state of denial that so often has characterized their
approach to immigration policy to date. They must develop
policies that recognize the inevitability of labour flows within
a globalized economy characterized by well-established
regional networks of trade, production, investment, and
communications. Attempts to suppress population flows that
are a natural consequence of a nation's insertion into these
economic networks will not be successful, but they will present
grave threats to individual rights, civil liberties, and human
dignity .... 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Human trafficking is usually thought of in terms of criminal or human
rights violations, rather than in terms of trade liberalization. By applying
trade liberalization principles to the problem of human trafficking, this
Article brings together the two superficially unrelated areas of law. The
purpose of this inquiry is to enhance understanding of modern trafficking in
human beings and to identify a mechanism that will undermine its economic
foundations. This Article concludes that, through the liberalization of labor,
economic and trade liberalization principles and theories can be used to
harness the power of the market to combat human trafficking and to further
human rights protection as a whole.
The contemporary enslavement of human beings is said to have increased
worldwide in the last few decades. The estimated number of people trafficked
annually across international borders or enslaved within states range from
hundreds of thousands to millions. 3 In response, states have targeted human
I Andrew Cockburn, 21st Century Slaves, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2003, at 2, 8.
2 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 293 (1998).
3 Commentators estimate that up to 4 million or at least 600,000-800,000 individuals are
trafficked annually across international borders. See Women as Chattel: The Emerging Global
Market in Trafficking, 1 GENDER MATTERS Q. 1, 1 (1999) (citing to United Nations 1997
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trafficking through the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime ("U.N. Transnational Crime Convention")4 and the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
("U.N. Trafficking Protocol"), 5 which supplements the Convention. In the
United States, federal legislators enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act ("TVPA"), the provisions of which are aimed at both domestic U.S. and
international trafficking, and thrice have reauthorized the legislation. 6
Modern trafficking in humans flourishes within four systemic tensions:
(1) the gaps between the rhetoric and reality of trade liberalization
undertaken thus far through multilateral and regional international
instruments; (2) the gap between the conceptualization of humans as rights-
bearing persons and as economic actors-both consumers and labor (an
economic input or commodity); (3) the tension between the
transnationalization unleashed by trade liberalization and Westphalian
concepts of statehood; 7 and (4) the tension between the recognition and
enforcement of human rights (and individual personhood) and state
sovereignty and control over constituent population and territory.
The solution proposed in this Article addresses the first two of these
tensions. To combat human trafficking, this Article contends that the
economic nature of humans-their economic roles in the global and economic
system-must be recognized more fully. That recognition will require that
human labor providers have the right to enter and exit individual domestic
calculations); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 6 (2006). But see Diana
Wong, The Rumor of Trafficking: Border Controls, Illegal Migration, and the Sovereignty of the
Nation-State, in ILLICIT FLOWS AND CRIMINAL THINGS: STATES, BORDERS, AND THE OTHER SIDE
OF GLOBALIZATION 69, 76 (Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham eds., 2005) ("Unverified
statistics, such as the figure of US $5 billion to US $7 billion a year in commercial profit, have
remained a standard feature [of the discussions about human trafficking].").
4 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, Annex I, at 44, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/45/49 (Vol.1) (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Transnational
Crime Convention].
5 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/25, at 60, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex 2, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (2001)
[hereinafter U.N. Trafficking Protocol].
6 Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2A, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000)
.(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 7101-7112 (LexisNexis 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009))
[hereinafter TVPA]; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003); Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164,
119 Stat. 3558 (2005); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457 (H.R. 7311), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
I have discussed this tension elsewhere. See Karen E. Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements and
Labor Liberalization: (Lost) Opportunities for Experimentation?, 28 ST. LOuIS PUB. L. REV. 71,
113 (2008) [hereinafter Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements] (noting that "[bly its very nature,
as a result of the economic forces it unleashes, trade liberalization constitutes a built-in
challenge to state sovereignty and mastery over state territory.").
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labor markets in response to economic stimuli and, therefore, are contrary to
the contemporary default operation of barricaded national borders.8
In an earlier article, I examined the use of the trans-Atlantic slave trade
analogy in the anti-trafficking discourse. 9 That exploration revealed the
essential similarity of the two forms of exploitation-fundamentally, they
both traffic in human labor.10 Further, the modern traffic in human beings
cannot be separated from the forces of globalization.'1 The contemporary
model of trade liberalization and the interaction of that model with
restrictive domestic immigration laws create disequilibrium and labor
market failures which in turn stimulate migration flows. 12 Human trafficking
is embedded within the disequilibrium and labor market failures. As such, an
attack against the structural foundations of human trafficking must target
the economic bases of the labor and other exploitation from which human
trafficking arises.
The failure to liberalize labor, the last classic factor of production not
freed from state constraints (other than immobile land), 13 undermines the
fundamental underpinnings of the vision of a globalized world that prioritizes
competition, efficiency, trade liberalization, and comparative advantage. If
8 No longer would the passport be a mechanism for the prevention of entry. Instead, it would
revert to its original purpose: identification and easier entry for the national of the issuing
political entity. See, e.g., MARTIN LLOYD, THE PASSPORT: THE HISTORY OF MAN'S MOST TRAVELED
DOCUMENT 30-44 (2003).
9 See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207 (2007) [hereinafter Bravo, Exploring the
Analogy].
10 See id. at 294. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 6 (2004) ("[Tlhe
21st century slave trade feeds a global demand for cheap and vulnerable labor.") (emphasis
added).
11 The term "globalization" signifies the greater integration of individual national economies into
a global economy. The increased integration brings with it the transnationalization of laws,
economies, and ways of thinking, doing, and living. Multilateral trade liberalization is the
principal engine of globalization.
12 See Bravo, Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 7 (discussing the failure to liberalize labor
as part of the contemporary trade liberalization project and advocating experimentation with
labor liberalization within regional trade arrangements). See also discussion infra Part II.B.
However, conditions in sending states also play a role in fostering human trafficking. e.g.,
obstruction of domestic economic development and corruption of governmental officials. See
Karen E. Bravo, Follow the Money?: Does the International Fight Against Money Laundering
Provide A Model for International Anti-Trafficking Efforts?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 138, 194
(2009).
13 This is the case despite re-conceptualization of some labor as "human capital" and the
increasing commodification of the human body and bodily services. A contemporary example is
the burgeoning Indian industry in outsourced fertility work. See, e.g., Jaspreet Nijher, After
Gujarat, Rent-a-womb Biz Booms in Punjab, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 27, 2008, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/IndiaIAfter Gujarat rent-a-womb biz booms in -Punjab/
articleshow/2735087.cms; Editorial, View: Make It a Safe and Legal Option, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb.
5, 2008, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/VIEWMake-it-a-safe-and_
legal optionarticleshow/2756865.cms.
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globalization and trade liberalization strive to and have substantially freed
capital and products from the constraints of state borders, why should self-
actualized, self-owning humanity not be similarly liberalized?
In addition, the failure to liberalize labor creates and increases
vulnerability to exploitation for many human labor providers. Individual
migrants, who comprise a significant source of trafficked persons, seek to
exchange their labor for value-to respond to market forces that promise
higher prices for their labor across internal domestic and/or international
borders. 14 Those borders are now heavily policed and enforced, and
unsanctioned crossing is essentially verboten. In seeking to trade their labor
and to navigate the state-created barriers (i.e., borders) to transnational
labor markets, individuals become more vulnerable to the predations of
exploitative middlemen such as traffickers in human beings.
To directly confront and harness the economic and trade-based forces
that support the expansion of modern trafficking in humans, this Article
proposes using a trade-law inspired lens that encompasses and supplements
the four frameworks now utilized in anti-trafficking efforts to interpret and
combat human trafficking.15 To do so, this Article advocates re-
conceptualizing modern human trafficking within the framework of the
domestic and transnational movement of peoples and migration, both licit
and illicit: 16 human trafficking is not a purely illegal and aberrational
activity taking place outside of legal and legitimate human economic activity
and movement.
This Article also proposes the re-conceptualization of labor's role in the
international economic system. It uses trade liberalization concepts to argue
14 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, Commie Ball: A Journey to the End of a Revolution, VANITY FAIR, July
2008 (describing the smuggling of Cuban baseball players to the United States, where the rate of
compensation for their labor is substantially higher); Caroline Brothers, South Asians Taking
Risky Route to Europe: Via Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at A3; Seth Mydans, 54 Who
Suffocated in Thailand Were Smuggled Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at A12.
15 For detailed discussions and analyses of these frameworks, see Bravo, Exploring the Analogy,
supra note 9, at 221-38; Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective
Response to Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
16 The licit/illicit and legal/illegal terminology continues to be useful, despite convincing evidence
of the porous barrier between these socially and legally constructed concepts. See, e.g., BRIDGET
ANDERSON & JULIA O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, IS TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS DEMAND DRIVEN?
A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 9 (2003):
[T]he idea that "trafficking" constitutes a subset of illegal migration relies on
an over-simplistic distinction between 'legal" and "illegal" migration. In
practice, even legal migration processes often have illegal elements, while
"trafficked" persons frequently enter a state legally. For instance, women
may legally enter as wives and then be subjected to forced labour.
Meanwhile, deception and exploitation are also features of legal labour
migration schemes, both during the process of migration and at the point of
destination.
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that efforts to combat human trafficking should seek the same status for
labor as that of, for example, capital or intellectual property in the
international trading system. This proposal challenges free market and trade
liberalization advocates to live up to the rhetoric of the free market by
extending the same "freedom" to labor as has been extended to capital, goods,
ideas, and entrepreneurship. 17 Specifically, this Article calls for a new annex
to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,1s a General
Agreement on Trade in Labor, with co-equal status to, for example, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), 19 the
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS")20 and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), 21 each of which is a
multilateral treaty and annex to the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Agreement and creates mandatory obligations for all members of the WTO.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses modern trafficking in human
beings as well as the responses by state and civil society, and finds that there
is a connection among the growth of human trafficking, increased trade
liberalization and globalization, and contradictory state barriers to the
transnational movement of labor in the global economy. Part III asserts that
a transnational trade in labor already exists, a trade that is exploited by
smugglers, traffickers, capital, and states, while not principally benefiting
the humans who perform the labor. Further, Part III explores and critiques
proposals that have been proffered to address the disequilibrium in
transnational labor markets, including the expansion of national guestworker
programs, labor liberalization within regional trade arrangements, and
expansion of the Mode 4 provisions of the GATS. 22 Part IV recommends the
liberalization of labor through the mechanism of a new multilateral annex to
the WTO Agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Labor. The
Conclusion maintains that the liberalization of labor would undermine the
economic foundations of the modern traffic in humans and create a variety of
other human rights and economic benefits.
17 Indeed, many economists support relaxation of the barriers to the movement of labor. See, e.g.,
Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 9, 2006 (discussing, inter
alia, the consensus among economists about the positive value of immigration for the U.S.
economy). See also 500-Plus Economists Sign Open Letter Reminding President Bush of the
Benefits of Immigration, NEWSROOM (Indep. Inst., Oakland, Cal.), June 19, 2006,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/news-detail.asp?NewsID=74.
18 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
19 WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
20 WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
21 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
22 For a discussion of the four Modes of the GATS, see infra Part II.B.1.
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II. CONTEMPORARY TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE TRADE IN HUMAN
BEINGS
Millions of people are said to be enslaved worldwide. 23 A 1999 CIA Report
estimated that trafficking in human beings was the third most profitable
illicit industry (after the trade in illicit drugs and weapons), a $7 to $12
billion industry, 24 and contradictory estimates are issued that hundreds of
thousands are trafficked annually across international borders and within
states. 25 Estimates fluctuate so that, at various times, anywhere from a low
estimate of 600,000-800,000 to a high estimate of 2 million men, women, and
children are said to be trafficked across international borders each year. 26
Approximately 80 percent of those who are trafficked are said to be women,
and of that number, as many as 50 percent are minors. 27 A majority of
trafficked persons are said to be destined for commercial sexual exploitation,
while others are enslaved for purposes of labor exploitation. 28 The numbers
discussed above do not reflect the millions of people who are victimized by
domestic trafficking and/or slavery within the borders of individual states. 29
Despite the resources expended toward preventing and punishing human
trafficking, the traffic appears to continue unabated. 30
The United States is by no means immune to this form of exploitation. In
1999, the CIA Report estimated that 50,000 individuals were trafficked
annually into the United States.31 That estimate has declined: the U.S. State
23 Kevin Bales, a well-known anti-slavery activist and author, has posited that 27 million
humans are enslaved worldwide. See KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY xii (2004).
24 See AMY O'NEILL RICHARD, INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A
CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME iii (1999), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmono
graphs/trafficking.pdf. This report is now arguably outdated and its methodology has been
criticized. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: BETTER DATA,
STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS ABROAD (2006)
[hereafter 2006 GAO REPORT]. It is cited here because the report provided much of the
foundation for the legislative intervention of the U.S. Congress in 2000.
25 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 TIP
REPORT]. But see Wong, supra note 3, at 69, 76.
26 See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 7.
27 There appears to be little dispute that women and children most often are the ones victimized.
See 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 24.
28 Id. at 12 tbl.2 (comparing victim profiles reported by various international agencies).
29 The International Labor Organization has estimated that 12.3 million people are enslaved in
forced labor, bonded labor, forced child labor, sexual servitude and involuntary servitude.
PATRICK BELSER, ET AL., INT'L LABOR OFFICE, MINIMUM ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR IN THE
WORLD 2 tbl. 1 (2005), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1006&context=nondiscrim.
30 See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 52-292 (giving an overview of trafficking in 170
countries).
31 See O'NEILL RICHARD, supra note 24, at iii.
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Department subsequently estimated that 14,500 to 17,500 individuals are
trafficked annually into the United States. 32 The horrific case of hundreds of
Indian guestworkers trafficked to the United States to perform post-Katrina
construction work on the Gulf Coast captured some public attention. 33
The application of a global economic and trade-based analysis to the
problem of trafficking clarifies the necessity of devoting more attention,
thought, and study to the economic impact on human trafficking by the
border enforcement and immigration barriers between labor-rich and labor-
poor economies. These barriers force would-be immigrants who are
responding to market forces to contract with smuggler-traffickers or corrupt
officials in order to make transborder journeys in search of viable economic
activity. 3 4  Labor-rich economies with high unemployment and
underemployment rates have high rates of poverty and desperation. These
factors can lead to the devaluation of human life and the sale of men, women
and children.
A. Overview of Modern Trafficking in Humans
The U.N. Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in human beings as:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs. 35
32 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 17. The decrease in the estimates of trafficked persons
within the United States does not reflect a decrease in the scope and/or size of the traffic.
Instead, the changing numbers result from the use of alternate methods of information gathering
and analysis. See id. for a discussion of methodological challenges to understanding the extent of
the modern traffic in humans.
33 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Workers on Hunger Strike Say They Were Misled on Visas, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2008, at A9; Indian Workers in U.S. Suspend Hunger Strike After 29 Days, HINDUSTAN
TIMES, June 12, 2008 [hereinafter Hunger Strike]. Although the recruiters may dispute the
charges of human trafficking, the experiences of the Indian workers appear to satisfy the
definition of human trafficking under U.S. law. See Complaint for Plaintiff, David v. Signal Int'l,
L.L.C., 2008 WL 4266214 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.nowcrj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/1 1/complaint-final.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Mydans, supra note 14; Brothers, supra note 14. See also Wong, supra note 3, at 82-
89.
- See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(a).
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The U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act defines sex trafficking as "the
purchase, sale, recruitment, harboring, transportation, transfer, or receipt of
a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act."36 "Severe forms of
trafficking" are defined as:
A. sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by
force, fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced to
perform such an act has not attained 18 year of age; or
B. the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. 37
The terminology used in anti-trafficking discourse illuminates the
conceptual foundations of current thinking about modern trafficking. For
example, legal instruments, activists, and scholars speak of the trafficking
victim and the trafficker. The discourse is replete with references to "source"
(usually developing or transitional countries), "destination" (developed and
industrialized, sometimes industrializing), and "transit" countries (all
profiles).38 The terminology includes "push" and "pull" factors, which are
usually attributed to the prospect of attractive transborder economic
opportunities and political stability that contrasts with the reality of
domestic political and economic instability in the trafficked person's country
of origin.39 The remarkable similarity of some terminology in the anti-
trafficking discourse to that used in migration and economic discourse and
the fundamental relationships revealed are insufficiently explored. Instead,
the anti-trafficking discourse and efforts manifest an overwhelming focus on
sex trafficking, with a considerably more limited recognition of labor
trafficking.
Both international instruments and U.S. domestic legislation make a
fundamental distinction between "human trafficking," with implications of
fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, victimhood, and "human/migrant
smuggling," where the individual may pay or agree to pay another for
facilitated transborder movement in contravention of the domestic law of the
home and/or the host state. 40 This distinction is flawed, serving to mask the
36 See TVPA § 7102(9).
37 See id. § 7102(8).
38 See, e.g., 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 12.
39 For example, the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, with the explosion in the number
of economies in transition from a government-managed to a free market system, and the increase
in conflict situations-civil wars, wars between states, insurrections and other types of conflict-
are said to have increased the flow of trafficked persons from Eastern European countries. See,
e.g., Wong, supra note 3, at 76; PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMAN, POLICING THE GLOBE:
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 34 (2006).
40 Compare the definitions of trafficking quoted above with the following definition of human
smuggling: "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
[Vol. 18:545
FREE LABOR! LABOR LIBERALIZATION SOL UTION
often symbiotic relationship between the two types of transborder
movement 41 by shrouding migrant smuggling and human trafficking in
contrasting types of illegality and vilification, instead of placing them along a
continuum of rational and less-to-more exploitative responses to the
contradictory international economic and migration systems.
Furthermore, the distinction hides state complicity, drawing attention
away from the role played by domestic legal regimes, such as immigration
laws, in creating and guiding the flow of the market in humans and their
labor. The distinction requires the analyst to determine the status of the
individual (Victim or compliant illegal migrant? Trafficker or smuggler? Or
both?); it does not invite examination or criticism of the provisions of
domestic immigration laws. In addition, the distinction made between human
smuggling and human trafficking has been challenged by some scholars, who
point out that the distinction serves to increase the power of the state to
determine the status of the individual-whether the kidnapped individual is
a trafficking victim deserving of assistance or a smuggled migrant complicit
in the individual's own forbidden transborder movement. 42
1. Conceptual and Legal Frameworks
Together' with other domestic and international mechanisms and
instruments utilized to combat trafficking in human beings, 43 the U.N.
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a
national or a permanent resident." See U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol Against the Smuggling by Land, Sea and Air,
Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Annex III, U.N.
Doc. A/55/383, art. 3(a) (2000) [hereinafter the Migrant Smuggling Protocol]. Article 3(b) of the
Migrant Smuggling Protocol defines "illegal entry" to "mean crossing borders without complying
with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving state." Id. art. 3(b).
41 See ANDERSON & O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
42 See Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant
Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 975, 1000 (2001):
Implementation of the new distinction between trafficked persons and
smuggled migrants is likely to be controversial. The failure of the protocol to
provide guidance on the identification issue is a significant, and no doubt
deliberate, weakness. The potential problems are as follows: Under the terms
of the two protocols, dealing with trafficked persons will be more costly and
impose a greater administrative burden on states than dealing with
smuggled migrants. States therefore have an incentive to ratify one and not
both protocols. For the same reasons, border authorities and immigration
officials responsible for identifying and categorizing irregular migrants also
have an incentive to identify such persons as being smuggled rather than as
trafficked.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Jennifer Chac6n, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures
of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977 (2006).
43 Other regional anti-trafficking instruments include the Council of Europe Convention on
Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings opened for signature May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197,
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation's Convention on Preventing and
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, Jan. 5, 2002, available at http://
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Transnational Crime Convention, the U.N. Trafficking Protocol, and the
TVPA fall within four commonly utilized conceptual frameworks deployed
both to foster understanding of the modern traffic in human beings and to
combat it-the human rights, women's rights, labor rights, and law
enforcement frameworks. 44 Of these, the law enforcement framework is
predominant both internationally and in the U.S. domestic system. 45
a. Law Enforcement
Both the U.N. Transnational Crime Convention and the accompanying
U.N. Trafficking Protocol, as well as the U.S. TVPA, exemplify the law
enforcement perspective. Pursuant to this perspective, the component
activities of trafficking in humans are criminalized, the trafficker is punished
through prosecution and imprisonment, 46 and prevention is pursued through
education of both vulnerable groups and the source societies. 47 Also included
in this perspective are attempts to protect the trafficked individual by
refraining from prosecuting him/her for violation of, for example, immigration
and/or anti-prostitution laws, as well as initiatives to rehabilitate and
repatriate the trafficked person. 48 States party to the U.N. Transnational
Crime Convention and the Trafficking Protocol commit to international
www.decemberl8.net/traffickingconventionsSAARC2002.pdf, and the Organization of American
States' American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, at
1144, Organization of American States, at OEA/Ser.LIV/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treatiesb-32.html, and 1994 Inter-American Convention on
International Traffic in Minors, Mar. 18, 1994, 79 O.A.S. T.S., 33 I.L.M. 721, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treatiesb-57.html.
44 For more detailed discussion and critique of the dominant frameworks, see Bravo, Exploring
the Analogy, supra note 9, at 221-43; Bruch, supra note 15, at 1.
45 Bravo, Exploring the Analogy, supra note 9, at 27.
46 See U.N. Transnational Crime Convention, G.A. Res 55/254, arts. 2(b), 3, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) (outlining the scope of application of the Convention and the range of
punishment applicable to covered crimes).
47 Section 106 of the TVPA (Prevention of Trafficking), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104, requires the
implementation of public awareness and information programs as well as economic programs
such as "microcredit lending schemes" and "programs to promote women's participation in
economic decision-making." See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). The U.N. Trafficking Protocol provides that "States
Parties shall endeavour to undertake measures such as research, information and mass media
campaigns and social and economic initiatives to prevent and combat trafficking in persons."
U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 5, art. 9, 2.
48 For example, the U.S. TVPA provides for the creation of special visas to be granted to
trafficked persons who cooperate with law enforcement, including testifying against their
traffickers. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (2000), § 107(e) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to create T
visas). In order for the trafficked persons to qualify for the visa, law enforcement must certify
that individual's cooperation in prosecuting the trafficker. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(0(1), (h)(1)
(2006). For a critique of the impact of the certification requirement, see Jayashri Srikantiah,
Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 85
B.U. L. REV. 151, 179-84 (2007).
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cooperation and information exchange efforts aimed at combating trafficking
in humans. 49
b. Human Rights
The second most influential of the frameworks is the human rights
framework, which focuses on the violation of internationally recognized and
enforceable individual legal rights against enslavement, exploitation, and the
right to protection of bodily integrity, among other rights. Some international
legal instruments applicable to this framework include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"),50 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),51 the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights ("IESCR"),52 and various anti-slavery
conventions. 53
c. Labor Rights
The labor rights, women's rights, and children's rights frameworks all
focus on specialized categories of human rights. The labor rights perspective
centers on the quality of the work experience, i.e., the violation of the legally
mandated minimum protection standards applicable to work and the
workplace. Some relevant international instruments include the following
International Labour Organization ("ILO") conventions: the 1930 Forced
Labor Convention, 54 the 1948 Convention on Protection of Wages,5 5 and the
1957 Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor. 56 A relatively
new international treaty that falls within the labor rights perspective is the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
49 U.N. Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 4, arts. 18-21, 26, 27.
5o G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A1810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
51 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1966) (ICCPR) (prohibiting slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labor).
52 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) (IESCR) (recognizing rights to just and favorable conditions of work and fair
wages).
53 See, e.g., Slavery Convention of 1926, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, U.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S.
253; 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, entered into force Apr. 30, 1957, 266 U.N.T.S. 40.
See A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic
and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN. ST. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (2005).
54 Convention (ILO No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S.
55 (1930).
55 Convention (ILO No. 95) on Protection of Wages, Jan. 1949 (entered into force Sept. 24, 1952)
(partially revised by ILO Convention No. 173).
56 Convention (ILO No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 29 (1957).
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Workers and Members of Their Families, 57 which entered into force in July
200358 and recognizes the rights of migrant workers and the obligations of
states parties to such workers.
d. Women's and Children's Rights
The women's and children's rights framework attempts to combat human
trafficking by focusing on the specialized rights of women and children that
are recognized and agreed to by states in international instruments. The
relevant instruments are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),59 which specifically prohibits
trafficking and sexual exploitation 60 and delineates other rights and
obligations agreed to by states, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child6l with its two protocols, 62 which impose on signatory states the
obligations to protect children from various forms of exploitation. Pursuant to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its protocols, the exploitation
of children is forbidden, and member states recognize obligations to protect
the development of children, as well as their physical, moral, and spiritual
health. 63
2. Critiques of the Frameworks: Too Little, Too Narrow, and Not
Enough!
This Article acknowledges the validity and necessity of these dominant
perspectives in generating understanding of modern human trafficking and
in attempting to combat it.64 The vitality of these frameworks will be
essential to the success of the solution proposed in Part IV. Political, social,
and economic transformations create vulnerabilities in certain populations;
57 G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990). The Convention's broad definition of
migrant worker appears to extend the protections of the Convention to trafficked persons. Article
2.1 provides, "The term 'migrant worker' refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or
has engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national." Id. art.
2.1.
58 Press Release, Convention on Protection of Rights of Migrant Workers to Enter Into Force
Next July, U.N. Doc. L/T/4371 (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2003ILT4371.doc.htm.
59 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1979).
0Id. art 6.
61 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].
62 The two protocols are the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflicts, and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, GA Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000). For
further discussion, see Bravo, Exploring the Analogy, supra note 9, at 232-36.
63 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 61, arts. 32, 34, 36.
64 This Article does not reject the four existing anti-trafficking frameworks, but instead seeks to
supplement and strengthen their effectiveness.
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exploiters must be sought out and punished; and the rights of trafficked
persons must be vindicated.
However, the perspectives gained through these frameworks are
incomplete. They fail to take into account fundamental economic principles
and forces, such as supply and demand, and their effects on both licit and
illicit traffic and trade. Specifically, if human beings need jobs and those jobs
are unavailable in their domestic markets, they will attempt to access
transborder markets where jobs are available. Moreover, if the demand for
labor cannot be satisfied by legitimate distribution networks, then
unauthorized networks will emerge to supply the labor market. Furthermore,
the existing frameworks lack the tools necessary to effectively combat the
traffic in humans. The foreseeable consequence of the foregoing legal and
conceptual frameworks is the prospect of continuous prosecutions and rights
vindications in response to an unending stream of violations and criminal
activity.65
The law enforcement/criminal violation framework is excessively
prosecution-focused, with only token prevention initiatives. 66 Furthermore,
the effectiveness of this framework in anti-human trafficking efforts is
undermined by the creation of the image, pursuit, rescue, and vindication of
the "innocent," pure, and sexually exploited victim who has played neither a
voluntary nor an active role in her unsanctioned transnational movement. 67
In addition, the human rights frameworks-here, encompassing the broader
human rights framework as well as the more specialized labor, women's and
children's rights frameworks-are not capable of creating a complete picture
of the human trafficking phenomenon. This undermines their potential
effectiveness in eliminating and/or successfully combating the traffic in
65 The institutional and conceptual investments currently undertaken with respect to human
trafficking are all too reminiscent of the institutional and other investments in the "War on
Drugs." We are all too familiar with the successes of that particular "War." See, e.g., ANDREAS &
NADELMAN, supra note 39, at 251-52.
66 See, e.g., Bravo, Exploring the Analogy, supra note 9, at 240 n.173. See also Chac6n, supra note
42.
67 See generally Srikantiah, supra note 48 (claiming that domestic anti-trafficking efforts are
undermined by both the legal construction of "perfect" victims and the search for them).
Andrijasevic's analysis of the trafficking of Eastern European Women in Italy provides a useful
example:
[T]he current legal conceptualization of trafficking not only disqualifies
women's agency by establishing a normative narrative grounded in forced
migration, coercion into prostitution and economic exploitation, but also
penalizes those women who fall out of the established norm. By being refused
access to [the definition of trafficked victim under Italian law], they are
unable to legalize their status, and might be deported.
Rutvica Andrijasevic, The Difference Borders Make: (Jl)legality, Migration and Trafficking in
Italy Among Eastern European Women in Prostitution, in UPROOTINGs/REGROUNDINGS:
QUESTIONS OF HOME AND MIGRATION 251, 264 (Sara Ahmed et al. eds., 2003).
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human beings. 68 The central question is: "Where are the teeth?" I.e., do the
international human rights instruments confer the power to impose effective
and enforceable punitive and preventive sanctions? The relevant
instruments, such as the CEDAW, UDHR, ICCPR, and IESCR, recognize and
demand the protection of beautifully enunciated rights of the individual
human being. Yet, these instruments accomplish very little for the trafficked
person as a violated rights-bearer. Each of these instruments suffers from the
flaws of limited enforcement and the applicable monitoring bodies'
constrained ability to assess or impose meaningful sanctions against violators
or grant relief to trafficked persons. 69
The U.N. Trafficking Protocol includes some provisions that address
economic issues, such as the exhortations regarding the need for economic
stimulus of source countries. 70 However, all four of the dominant frameworks
are flawed by their failure to systematically consider economic theories and
principles and take them to their logical conclusion. 71 An economics and
trade-based lens, applied from a global perspective, gives rise to the insight
that the flows of trafficked persons and entrepreneurial traffickers stem from
fundamental economic disparities and distortions. These disparities and
distortions are integrally intertwined with contemporary trade liberalization
6 5 Anderson and O'Connell Davidson explain:
When "trafficking" is construed principally as a phenomenon experienced by
women and girls forced into prostitution, eliding customer demand for sexual
services and employer demand for cheap labour, measures to suppress
demand may superficially appear to represent an effective way forward.
However, applied to the many other sectors where large numbers of
migrants, internal and international, are grossly abused and exploited to
produce cheap good and services, the idea of clamping down on consumer
demand seems a rather less obvious approach.
See ANDERSON & O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 43.
69 See Bravo, Exploring the Analogy, supra note 9, at 233-34; see also Frank Emmert, Labor,
Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75, 80-90
(2003) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing the human rights provisions of even the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and the IESCR, the three foundational instruments of modern human rights law). Some
states in the global South have attempted to give greater teeth to the domestic implementation
of international human rights through, for example, constitutionalizing the rights and/or judicial
activism. Examples include South Africa and India. See JEANNE WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 653-780
(2005) (discussing the approaches of South Africa and India). However, such domestic
approaches do not create global implementation or enforcement.
70 The U.N. Trafficking Protocol provides that "States Parties shall take or strengthen measures,
including through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make
persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty,
underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity." U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 5, art.
9.4. The U.S. TVPA also requires the establishment of some economic mechanisms to combat
human trafficking. See TVPA § 106(a).
71 The U.S. TVPA does provide for a new private right of action to trafficked persons that will
allow such trafficked persons to recover compensation/unjust profits from the trafficker. The
Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2003 provides this new remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595
(2005).
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and globalization efforts, and the contradictory domestic immigration laws of
individual states.
The causes of modern trafficking in humans are profoundly economic.
Human trafficking simultaneously violates human rights, state borders, and
criminal laws, and is a profit-making industry that is transnational in scope.
Application of an economics and trade-based perspective creates greater
structural understanding of human trafficking, and confers insight about
human trafficking's links to-and integration into-"legitimate" global and
domestic economies. To confront human trafficking head-on, it is necessary to
examine the phenomenon in all its manifestations-both labor- and sex-
trafficking.
Therefore, this Article proposes the addition of greater nuance to the
understanding of human trafficking. Trafficking rings are not merely
criminal enterprises; they are also, foremost and fundamentally, profit-
seeking and generating enterprises.72 The human beings that are the subject
of their economic activity are both exploitable human capital and exploitable
natural resources, such as timber or minerals. 73 The traffickers in human
beings are both criminal exploiters and the means of transborder transit for
their victims, who are moved from countries of underemployment or
unemployment to countries that offer employment opportunities. 74 That
enriched understanding leads to re-characterization of the terminology: the
"source" country becomes the "labor-rich" country; the "destination" country
becomes "labor-poor." With this understanding, the relationships among
international migration, international trade, and human trafficking regimes
become clearer.
B. Trade Liberalization Disequilibrium: "Liberalizing" Trade and
Disrupting the Transnational Labor Market
Globalization in its present form and shape is the outcome of a
political project aiming at universalizing global capitalism
and neo-liberal principles. Economic globalization . . . does
contribute to contemporary forms of slavery by increasing
72 Traffic in human beings is reported to be the third largest illicit industry. See O'NEILL
RICHARD, supra note 24, and accompanying text.
73 See generally Louise Shelley, Trafficking in Women: The Business Model Approach, 10 BROWN
J. WORLD AFF. 119 (2003) (describing different profit seeking and operational models of
traffickers from different states and geographic regions).
74 See, e.g., Andrijasevic, supra note 67, at 265 (reporting that "the migrant women's narratives
suggest that for them, making use of the trafficking networks became one of the few available
means of informal labour migration"). See also id. at 259 ("Contrary to the idea that women are
always forced or coerced by traffickers into illegal migration, some respondents tell of how they
were only able to realize their plans to leave ... with the help of traffickers.").
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poverty and therefore vulnerability for specific groups of
people.75
Human smuggling and trafficking-the illegal and forced transnational
movement of labor-are not aberrations; they evidence the functioning of a
distorted market and are entirely and logically responsive to contemporary
global market forces. The transnational labor market in which they are
embedded continues to be disrupted by the collision of the flawed
contemporary trade liberalization project (embodied in both the GATT/WTO
system 76 and the majority of regional trade arrangements) with increased
enforcement of domestic immigration laws and militarization of national
borders. 77 On the one hand, the contemporary trade liberalization project
refuses to recognize and give status to labor, both as a factor of production
and as an autonomously mobile economic unit. On the other hand, both in the
transnational economy and under domestic immigration laws, labor is
treated as a fungible economic unit and input. Labor is viewed as an
economic threat under immigration law, and mobile capital travels the globe
to determine where it can most cheaply and efficiently input labor into its
production activities. 7
The economic disequilibrium is fostered by an even deeper disjuncture in
perspective: the gap between the economic globalization enterprise,
supported by states and capital interests, and the refusal of those same states
and interests to recognize the integrative effects of economic integration on
even noneconomic aspects of human life. As a result of this shortsighted
perspective, states pursue and preserve constitutive borders, laws, and
national self interests; they simultaneously pursue and profit from trade
liberalization and economic globalization while fruitlessly attempting to
constrain the effects of those forces to a subset of economic areas.
The emphasis on cheapness and efficiency, and on increasing returns and
cheaper inputs may have led, at the extremes, to the commoditization of
humans, in their capacities as providers of labor, as trade objects or goods.
The preconditions for human trafficking may spring, as well, from within the
15 Christien van den Anker, Contemporary Slavery, Global Justice and Globalization, in THE
POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF NEW SLAVERY 22 (Christien van den Anker ed., 2004).
76 The GATT/WTO system refers to the legal and institutional frameworks by the GATT 1947
and the WTO Agreement and its Annexes created to regulate multilateral trade liberalization.
77 For in-depth critique of the flawed trade liberalization model, see Bravo, Regional Trade
Arrangements, supra note 7, at 79-83 (arguing that the omission of labor liberalization from
contemporary multilateral and regional trade liberalization endeavors is a serious flaw). The
contemporary model rests upon a belief in the benefits of increased transborder competition, but
eschews implementation of mechanisms that would allow labor to participate in transnational
labor markets. Instead, labor may suffer the transitional costs of trade liberalization with little
prospect of capturing the benefits of that increased "competition."
78 See discussion infra Part III.A.4 and note 244.
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intersection of the conceptualization of labor as purely a commodity 79 and
belief that capital owes very little to labor.8 0 Yet, that commoditization is
limited by the would-be immobilization of transborder labor movement
through application of legal prohibitions.
1. Incomplete Liberalization
Trafficking in human beings cannot be separated from trade
liberalization and the form of globalization it stimulates. Human trafficking
is embedded within the migration flows stimulated by the disequilibrium
caused by the contemporary model of trade liberalization,8 ' a model that
betrays both trade liberalization theory and free market principles.82
Growing transnational migration flows and trafficking in human beings stem
from the disjuncture between trade liberalization as currently undertaken
and the economic and trade liberalization theories on which the model is
purportedly based.
The contemporary trade liberalization project prioritizes the removal of
barriers to the transborder movement of capital, goods, services, legal
systems, and entrepreneurship among member states of trade liberalization
arrangements. Of the classical factors of production,8 3 labor alone is not a
79 This is evidenced by, for example, references to "human capital" that is an asset deployed in
production activities according to the demands of states and the owners of capital.
80 This is evidenced by the movement away from pension plans, toward mass layoffs, and away
from health care plans for retirees.
81 For example, with respect to the effects of the mode of trade liberalization embodied in
NAFTA, Andrew Cockburn has reported:
Many economists argue that the North American Free Trade Agreement has
made its own contribution to the flood of people trying to move north,
maintaining that cheap U.S. corn imported into Mexico has effectively driven
millions of Mexican peasant corn farmers out of business and off the land.
They suggest that for every ton of corn imported into Mexico, two Mexicans
migrate to the U.S.
Cockburn, supra note 1, at 2, 10.
82 See THERESA HAYTER, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION CONTROLS 3 (2d ed.
2004). Hayter states:
But the logic of economic liberalization has not been applied to the movement
of people. According to this logic, economic liberalization should of course
include the free movement of labour as well as goods and capital, and this in
turn, according to market theory, should lead to an equalisation of wage
levels internationally .... The aim of immigration controls is that there is no
such possibility [of liberalization of movement of labor]. They are a market
imperfection of an extreme variety, and one more demonstration that the so-
called free market does not in reality exist.
Id.
83 The other factors of production are capital and land. Some states further control the form of
potential participation of land in transborder economic activity through limits on the purchase of
land by non-nationals. Multilateral and bilateral investment treaties, which remove limits on the
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subject of this liberalization. Pursuant to the contemporary model of trade
liberalization, labor remains constrained by state borders and by its
treatment as a passive immobile input into the production of goods, services,
and ideas. Trade liberalization has been pursued multilaterally, through the
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT 1947") and the
agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations, the World Trade
Organization Agreement, and its Annexes (including multilateral and
plurilateral agreements).8 4 In addition, with the exception of the European
Union, which has liberalized the movement of citizens of EU Member
States,8 5  the majority of regional trade liberalization arrangements
worldwide has followed a similar model of trade liberalization.
As discussed in more detail elsewhere,8 6 the WTO Agreement and its
Annexes together constituted a great leap forward with respect to the depth
of trade liberalization and the breadth of coverage of trade goods and
economic areas.8 7 Furthermore, the majority of the world's states are now
members of the WTO, thus spreading the discipline of trade liberalization to
regions undreamed of during the depths of the Cold War. 88
movement of capital, frequently require the removal of such restrictions. See, e.g., ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 474-75 (2002) (describing some typical provisions
in bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") that prohibit the imposition of restrictions on capital
import and export).
84 See WTO Agreement and its Annexes, supra notes 18-21, and accompanying text.
5 The European Union has removed more restraints and barriers to the movement of Member
State nationals within EU borders than has any other regional trade arrangement. See, e.g.,
GEORGE BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 575-79; 630-64 (2d
ed. 2002). However, limits continue even here, as some Member States have not permitted
wholesale free movement, or have delayed its implementation. Some such limitations include the
limits imposed during specified transition periods for nationals of newly acceding Member
States. For example, the April 16, 2003 Accession Treaty setting the framework for the May 1,
2004 accession of ten new Member States included two-year transition periods for the movement
of the new Member States' nationals to some existing Member States. See European Commission
Report Says Free Movement of Workers Since the 2004 Enlargement Had a Positive Impact; 2.8 %
of the Irish Workforce non-E.U. Nationals, FINFACTS, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.finfacts.com
/irelandbusinessnews/publisharticle_10004812.shtml (outlining the restrictions, if any, imposed
by each existing EU Member State).
86 See generally Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 7.
87 The multilateral and plurilateral agreements that are the Annexes to the WTO Agreement
cover subjects ranging from the recognition and enforcement of intellectual property rights,
tariffs on goods, agriculture, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, among others. See WTO Agreement and its Annexes, supra notes 18-
21.
88 With the recent accession of Ukraine on May 16, 2008, 153 countries are now members of the
WTO. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 10, 2009). Cold
War tensions had prevented the creation of the International Trade Organization, which had
been intended as the trade analog to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. See RAM BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAw 1-3
(1998) (describing U.S. reluctance to create the International Trade Organization and resulting
reliance on GATT 1947, which had been intended as a provisional multilateral trade
liberalization instrument). The WTO membership now includes China, Vietnam, Ukraine, and
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Annex 1B to the WTO Agreement, the GATS, has been described as "the
only multilateral legal instrument of potential global applicability governing
the mobility of labor."8 9 Although indeed "applicable" to the liberalization of
labor, that applicability is limited. 90 The GATS provides, somewhat
indirectly, for some liberalization of labor. Under Mode 4 of the GATS, a
service supplier from State A may supply service in State B through the
presence of natural persons, i.e., the presence of the human labor provider
necessary for the delivery of that service. 91 (The other three Modes of the
GATS provide for the cross-border supply of a service from one member state
to another, 92 the transborder consumption of a service, 93 and the transborder
supply of service through establishment of a commercial presence. 94)
However, the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons, while referring
to temporary admission of foreign nationals into the territory of another WTO
member state as part of the business of supplying services abroad, expressly
excludes and disclaims an intent to affect individual member states' domestic
immigration laws or to create rights to access the labor market of individual
member states. 95 Further, to the extent that WTO member states have made
other formerly closed economies. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization,
Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last
visited May 10, 2009).
89 See Michele Klein Solomon, GATS Mode 4 and the Mobility of Labour, in INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 107, 107 (Ryszard Cholewinski
et al. eds., 2007).
90 As stated by Solomon, the GATS Mode 4 covers only "a subset of a subset of a subset" of the
transnational labor market. Id. at 111.
91 Pursuant to Article 1.2(d) of the GATS, supra note 21, trade in services is defined so as to
include the supply of a service "by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member." The definitions of
"person" and "natural person" included in Article XXVIII(j) and (k) of the GATS make clear that
a "natural person" is a human being. Id. art. XXVIII(j)-(k). The covered natural persons are
nationals of a member state or persons holding a reasonably analogous status (such as lawful
permanent residence) pursuant to the domestic laws of another member state.
92 With respect to Mode 1, the GATS provides for "The supply of a service from the territory of
one Member into the territory of any other Member." Id. art. 1.2(a). Examples include banking
services offered in one country and accessible in another country via the Internet.
93 With respect to Mode 2, the GATS provides for "the supply of a service in the territory of one
member to the service consumer of any other member." Id. art. 1.2(b). Examples include the
travel abroad of a national of one member to utilize education and tourism services in the
territory of another member state.
94 With respect to Mode 3, the GATS provides for "the supply of a service by a service supplier of
one Member through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member." Id. art. 1.2(c).
Examples include the establishment of a banking or insurance subsidiary of the juridical entity
of one member in the territory of another.
95 The GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement
provides that the GATS does not apply "to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to
the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship,
residence or employment on a permanent basis." See GATS Annex on Movement of Natural
Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement 2. Pursuant to GATS Article XXIX, the
Annexes are "an integral part of the [GATS]." Id.
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commitments under the GATS, and those limited commitments have been
implemented, liberalization of labor is restricted to highly skilled individuals
who serve the labor delivery interests of corporate entities. 96
In addition, Mode 4 addresses only the temporary movement of natural
persons, making the liberalization of human labor providers an even more
neglected aspect of trade liberalization. The liberalization and commitments
made under Mode 4 "[are] by far the smallest mode of service delivery in
terms of both trade flows and volume of scheduled concessions." 97
Furthermore, the concessions made thus far by the WTO member states
"refer almost exclusively to higher-level personnel, especially to intra-
corporate transferees, whose mobility is also related to Mode 3.'"9s Moreover,
the comparison of the WTO obligations and commitments made with respect
to services (including the labor of natural persons), capital, and intellectual
property, makes clear that the services, obligations, and commitments are by
far the least extensive. 99 In addition to the requirements regarding high-
skilled intra-company transfers, 100 the commitments that have been made
96 See Solomon, supra note 89, at 112 ("[Tbo date the commitments of nearly all WTO Members
under [Mode 4] are limited to the highly skilled, and within that group most often to intra-
corporate transferees, managers and executives."). See also Steve Charnovitz, Trade Law Norms
on International Migration, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 241, 248 (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Alexander Chetail eds., 2003).
97 See L. Alan Winters et al., Liberalising Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: An Agenda
for the Development Round, 26 WORLD ECON. 1137, 1137 (2003).
98 Id. Winters et al. go on to note that the commitments to date have limited advantages for
developing countries whose comparative advantage is with respect to unskilled and semi-skilled
human labor providers. Id. See also Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 274 ("As compared to other
services, the obligations on Mode 4 are shallower because they apply only to transient
movements."). That is, only the temporary movement of natural persons is addressed. See also
NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND GATS MODE 4:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED RULES ON TEMPORARY GLOBAL MOBILITY 3 (2005) ("[D]espite
the increasing importance of global mobility, it remains the least developed aspect of trade in
services under the [GATS].").
99 See Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 246-47 (comparing WTO obligations and commitments with
respect to technical barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, capital, and
intellectual property). The preference for liberalizing capital over liberalization of labor is
probably based on a misconception of the neutrality of capital. See Bravo, Regional Trade
Arrangements, supra note 7, at 97 (discussing this perception and offering a critique). Yet the
movement of capital has potentially more detrimental effects on individual domestic economies.
See Ryan Walters, Managing Global Mobility: Free Trade in Services in the Age of Terror, 6 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 92, 100 (2006):
Capital can flow in and out of a country overnight, increasing the risk
premium associated with investment in developing countries. Conversely,
labor mobility, due to the relative reluctance of people to leave their homes,
serves as a moderating force on the otherwise rapid effects of globalization
while simultaneously providing market discipline.
Id. (notes omitted).
100 See, e.g., Joy Kategekwa, Extension of Mode 4 Commitments to Include Unskilled Workers in
the WTO: A Win-Win Situation, Especially for LDCs, Presentation at WTO Public Forum 2006,
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are hedged by extensive prerequisites such as pre-employment authorization
prior to application, and validity with respect to a single employer or
industry, among others. ' 0 1
In sum, in complete contradiction of labor's role in economic production
and in the transnational markets, the current model of trade liberalization
does not liberalize individual movement of labor. In other areas of economic
practice the aggregated demands of individual consumers, producers,
importers, and exporters are perceived as the voice of "the market." Labor
providers should be treated in the same way. 0 2 The autonomy of the
individual should trump protectionist nation state constraints on movement.
In the case of intellectual property, for example, substantial transborder
rights are recognized in individual owners.10 3 By contrast, with respect to
labor, a human labor provider's access to transborder markets is contingent
on national origin and/or the corporate or other capital exporting enterprise
that has the ability to act on its own initiative to take advantage of nation
state trade liberalization commitments.
The timidity of the Mode 4 commitments contrasts with the rejection of
nation state regulation that characterizes the rest of the WTO regime and
other aspects of international economic law.'0 4 The contrast may stem from
the nature of labor's limited access to the legislative and political process,
which differs from the greater access and influence that capital interests may
enjoy. The disfavor with which organized labor is regarded makes the
at 3 (Sept. 25-26, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/public-forume /session_26
_num24_e.htm:
Most of the Mode 4 commitments in Member's [sic] schedules to date pertain
almost totally to highly skilled personnel, in particular intra-corporate
transferees who move within the framework of juridical persons typically
large multi-national companies. Such commitments have limited utility for
[Least Developed Countries] because their "comparative advantage" lies in
low and medium-skilled services.
Id.
101 Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 247-49.
102 The CATS obligation with respect to the movement of natural persons is so weak that it does
not even require adherence to and enforcement of the fundamental human right to freedom of
movement. Pursuant to existing human rights obligations, individuals have freedom to move
within their country of origin and to leave their country of origin, but not to enter another
country. The GATS does not require member state adherence to the right of departure. See
Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 246 ("It should be noted that Mode 4 does not include any
obligations for the country of origin to allow an individual to exit.").
103 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, arts. 1-4 (making multilateral WTO member state
obligations to recognize and enforce intellectual property rights granted in another member
state).
104 A telling example is the extensive liberalization of capital imposed by BITs. For a discussion
and analysis of the spread of BITs and of their effects on less developed countries, see Zachary
Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265 (2008); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
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collective expression of labor's will more difficult, while individual labor
providers are unable to exert analogous pressure.
Mode 4 maintains the status quo, leaving to states the initiative to
provide content to non-defined terms and conditioning human (labor)
movement on the provision of services by enterprises. As a consequence, it
facilitates the movement of skilled workers, but ignores the movement of the
unskilled, whose labor is in demand in labor-poor countries. This betrayal of
trade liberalization and economics theories and principles, in conjunction
with domestic immigration laws that view and treat labor as an economic
unit, provide the economic pillars of human trafficking. The failure to
liberalize labor creates and increases the vulnerability to exploitation of
individual labor providers seeking to trade their labor across borders. The
movement of individual human labor providers responding to transborder
market forces is too often deemed illegal by the interposition of domestic
immigration law. 105 Human trafficking, like human smuggling, is the seamy
underside of the imposition of illegality by state authorities. 106
In denying legal transborder mobility to the majority of human labor
providers, nation states seek to have it both ways. They employ both the
rhetoric of globalization and integration, as well as the contradictory rhetoric
of exclusion. At the same time, their migration policies are policies of
exclusion characterized by incomplete trade liberalization and draconian
immigration laws. This toxic stew of contradiction is further poisoned by
inadequate enforcement of domestic immigration laws interacting with legal
temporary labor programs, both of which are unable to anticipate and satisfy
the domestic demand for labor and are inadequately monitored to avoid
exploitation of the temporary workers. 10 7
105 Van den Anker explains:
Another link between trafficking and the globalization of capitalism is that
the increasingly free flow of capital is not accompanied by the free flow of
people. On the contrary, immigration rules are becoming more and more
restrictive, so poor people hardly ever have the option of becoming legal
economic migrants.
Van den Anker, supra note 75, at 22.
106 Andrijasevic notes that, in the case of the European Union:
[D]ata suggests that E.U. borders, visa-regimes and restrictive immigration
regulations that aim at suppressing trafficking and hampering the illegal
movements of people work in favour of the third parties who organize
trafficking, whether individuals and agencies, because they become a kind of
supplementary migration system or even an alternative to the E.U. regulated
migration.
See, e.g., Andrijasevic, supra note 67, at 262 (emphasis added).
107 See discussion infra Parts III.A.l.a, III.Al.b.
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2. Restrictions on Human Mobility: Historical Anomaly
The widespread barriers imposed by political entities against the
movement of people and their labor are a relatively new development in
world history. In order to satisfy the labor demands of their domestic
economies and the economies of their overseas territories, the predecessor
empires to today's economically developed states-such as Great Britain,
Portugal, and Spain-funded, supported, and protected the migration of
Europeans to other continents and markets. 108 These predecessor empires
also funded and supported trans-Atlantic slavery and other forms of coerced
labor movements and labor extraction. 10 9 During the time of dislocations
caused by industrialization (rapid and transformative economic
development), European political entities had a ready outlet for their "excess"
human labor providers who sought out transborder economic opportunities.
The labor market was liberalized: individual labor providers faced logistical
difficulties (and xenophobic policies and attitudes once they reached their
destinations), but movement was facilitated by the lack of barriers and by the
fact that the colonial outposts were part of the empire. This era of liberalized
human movement was replete with human rights abuses and forms of
exploitation such as slavery and indentured servitude. Further, migrants
often were "welcomed" with xenophobic reactions by the host populations. 110
108 See According to Massey et al.:
Prior to the Second World War, world migration flows were dominated by
Europeans. Mass emigration began in the British Isles with the Industrial
Revolution and moved south and east across the Continent as industrialism
spread. The vast majority of emigrants went to one of five frontier societies
that were themselves in the throes of rapid economic development: the USA,
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, or Australia. The massive out-migration of
Europeans ended during the Great Depression of the 1930s and a revival of
significant international movement was largely precluded during the 1940s
by the hostilities of the Second World War.
MASSEY ETAL., supra note 2, at 275.
109 For example, according to Theresa Hayter:
This lack of freedom of movement may be one of the reasons why vast
international inequalities of wealth persist and are growing. The wealth of
Europe and other industrialized countries was built, from the sixteenth
century onwards, through the exploitation of the natural resources and
people of the rest of the world. Europeans used the labour of conquered
peoples to produce raw materials and primary products for consumption in
Europe, and they destroyed the industries of the more advanced civilizations
they encountered in their imperial expansion. They then embarked on their
own industrialization and they protected their new industries through
quotas, tariffs and prohibitions. Once they had established their dominance,
they advocated free trade.
HAYTER, supra note 82, at 2. Arguably, movement within empires in the mercantilist colonial era
primarily took place within the borders of particular empires and was not primarily
international.
110 Examples include the reactions to Chinese and Japanese migrant laborers in the United
States, as well as the reactions to mass migrations to the United States by Eastern Europeans.
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However, human labor providers were not dependent on visas and other
mechanisms of political control and could move to other regions so long as
they could afford to do so.
The growth of the nation state and the concomitant increase in legislative
and other barriers to the movement of people has driven and continues to
drive underground the movement of human labor providers. Systematic
barriers to labor movement arose with the nation state and became
entrenched during the Cold War. States turned to the widespread use of
passports for security and population control reasons in the aftermath of
World War I, and passports have been increasingly securitized since then."1 !
Even as recently as the immediate post-World War II era, the transnational
movement of labor from labor-rich to labor-starved regions and political
entities was liberalized in order to respond to the demands of the individual
domestic markets. 112 New migration flows emerged to tap economic
opportunities in newly industrializing and wealthy locations. "3
See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAwS 52-58 (2007).
I" See MARK B. SALTER, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 79-84
(2003). Salter describes the use of the passport after World War I to both facilitate and control
movement, in particular the movement of refugees and other "marginal and dangerous elements
of society[.]" Id. at 81.
112 Massey et al. explain:
New origin and destination countries emerged after 1950 to yield entirely
new international migration systems. Canada and the USA formed the core
of a new North American system that attracted migrants not from Europe,
but from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Europe, meanwhile,
gradually shifted from the exportation to the importation of labour, a
transformation that began in Britain and Germany shortly after 1950 and
ended in Spain, Italy, and Portugal during the mid-1970s, yielding a well-
defined system structure that by the 1990s connected Western Europe to
source countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 275.
113 Massey et al. provide an example:
The rapid accumulation of capital in oil-exporting countries of the Middle
East after 1973 led to a massive investment in infrastructure that required
the importation of labour on a grand scale. With a few years, the Gulf States
had joined the ranks of immigrant-receiving nations to form the core of an
international migration system that steadily expanded its geographic reach
away from sources in the Middle East towards the Indian subcontinent, East
Asia, and South-East Asia. By the 1990s most migrants into the Gulf region
were from Asia rather than the Middle East.
During the 1980s, Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Singapore,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Malaysia underwent a rapid shift
from the exportation to the importation of labour, pulling in workers from
poorer countries throughout Asia and the Pacific.
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Barriers to the movement of labor were erected and enforced during the
heightened suspicions of the Cold War, and a curious, inverse relationship
developed between the emergence of internationally recognized human rights
and the attempted legal immobilization of transborder human movement.
This relationship manifests in asynchronous growth of international
recognition of human rights simultaneously with the dehumanization of "the
other" when the non-national dares to transgress national boundaries
uninvited. 114 Depending on the type of immigrant, the dehumanization may
be state-facilitated or private. Private dehumanization (racism, ethnic
prejudice) serves to preserve the way of life and homogeneity of the culture.
State-based dehumanization (through limitations on the rights of "the other"
and the obligations owed by legal institutions) defends the state's figurative
and physical boundaries. The potential abuses that might arise with this
Article's proposal for the contemporary global liberalization of labor would be
checked, in part, by greater state adherence to and enforcement of
international human rights and domestic civil rights norms.
3. Resulting Disjuncture
Nation states have been complicit in laying the foundations and
preconditions of the modern traffic in human beings. 115 There is a deep
conflict between state-centered ways of thinking 116 and the globalization
114 See JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT x-xi
(1983) (discussing the anthropological concept of "the other").
15 For example, A. Yasmine Rassam claims that:
The rise of modern forms of slavery is partially attributable to economic
globalization that allows capital to find the cheapest labor possible. Official
corruption also plays a role in enforcing and facilitating slave labor. Although
globalization of economic forces is hardly a new phenomena [sic], modern
technology and rapid communications allow for greater "economic
interdependence, deregulation, and a dominance of the marketplace that
includes a shifting of responsibilities from state to non-state actors."
Globalization facilitates multinationals' expansion into less-developed
countries where they are increasingly complicit in forced and slave labor
through the involvement of subcontractors.
Rassam, supra note 53, at 825 (citation omitted). The corruption of government officials and
business people who appropriate for themselves the proceeds of national patrimony deepens the
effects of economic dislocations and helps stimulate the transborder movement of vulnerable
groups and individuals. Id.
116 For example, as explained by Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham:
[M]any states pursue the neo-liberal dream of a borderless economy and at
the same time barricade their borders to keep out the specter of international
organized crime networks, terrorist organizations, and individuals trafficking
in illegal objects, substances, human beings and ideas. The contradictions
between state ideology and border praxis, between the border as a categorical
divide and the border as an interactive process, can be startling. Here the
state criminalizes certain forms of mobility but clashes with other state
practices condoning or encouraging such border crossings. An example is the
United States' spectacular surveillance of the Mexico border, ostensibly to
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inspired by trade liberalization, and the integrative forces that it unleashes
against the state structures and political organization. States lay the
foundations for the thriving market in human labor represented by illegal
immigration and its most exploitative form-human trafficking-by creating
the preconditions for human smuggling, and by extension human trafficking,
together with their failure to deploy consistent internal and international
policies regarding the movement of peoples.
Individual migrants (a key source of trafficked persons) seek to exchange
their labor for value and to respond to market forces that promise higher
prices for their labor if they cross either internal or international borders.
However, in public discourse and in contradiction of historical norms,
117
human labor providers attempting to respond to the transborder labor
market are peculiarly despised. 118 The evolution of the nation state and the
increase in the legislative and other barriers to the movement of peoples has
driven and continues to drive the movement of people (and their labor)
underground. In seeking to sell that labor and to navigate the state-created
barriers (borders) to the market, individuals become more vulnerable to the
predations of exploiters such as the traffickers. 119
State complicity also comes from the collision of the implementation of an
incomplete trade liberalization model with an increasingly restrictive
throttle the supply of "illegal aliens," but without taking effective measures to
dampen domestic demand for these immigrants (e.g., by penalizing employers
of cheap "unauthorized" labor).
Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham, Introduction: The Making of Illicitness, in ILLICIT FLOWS
AND CRIMINAL THINGS: STATES, BORDERS, AND THE OTHER SIDE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 23-24
(Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham eds., 2005).
117 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
118 See HAYTER, supra note 82, at 1 (providing an example in the term of abuse most frequently
used against refugees themselves, that they are in reality "economic refugees," rather than
political ones and therefore "bogus," abusing the system). Yet, the growth of the United States
and other industrialized nations was based on the movements of just such economic migrants,
119 Anderson and O'Connell Davidson list and explain the factors:
The factors that expose migrants to exploitation are linked to questions about
immigration/citizenship status, lack of access to support networks and
economic status .... Both internal and international migration can create
dependence on employers, whether they are private householders, pimps,
gangsters, entrepreneurs, or business operators. Regular migrants may
require employers to validate their immigration status, but when they are
undocumented they require their cooperation to not reveal their status. In
some sectors this may cause particular problems for the migrant, for instance
when the employer has the potential to exercise a high degree of personal
power over the worker either because the work is unregulated or even illegal,
or because workers are isolated, or depend on the employer for other needs
such as accommodation, food, and so on .... Dependence is heightened by
lack of access to support, and migrants, internal and international, often do
not have kin or friendship networks to fall back on.
ANDERSON & O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 44.
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domestic immigration regime. 120 The contradictory orientation of two legal
regimes that, logically, should complement each other lays the groundwork
for exploitation. 121 Guestworker programs and other forms of "managed
migration" 122 implement ad hoc state policymaking that attempts to cure the
labor market disequilibrium resulting from the contradictions of the
overarching trade and immigration legal regimes. 123 However, those
programs serve to enshrine the exploitation of the transborder worker in the
domestic legal regime, domestic labor market, and domestic social norms. 124
Nation states allow nationalist fervor to overcome economic logic.125 The
increasing use of barriers to movement of humans (and their labor) is based,
among other things, on concern for national security. Also present is the fear
120 The restrictive immigration policies evidence the conflict between political forces and
economic realities on the ground. See Norimitsu Onishi, Enclave of Brazilians Test Insular
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at A9 (summarizing Japanese hostility to immigration despite
the economic and other challenges caused by Japan's aging population).
121 Bridget Anderson discusses the relationship between restrictive immigration laws and
exploitability:
It is particularly difficult for a person who is undocumented to exercise her
rights, because she may be deported if she comes to the attention of the
authorities. Rights given with one hand are effectively taken away with the
other. This is most clearly revealed in the practice of dependent immigration
status prevalent in the USA and Europe. While employers do not "own" their
workers and cannot legally do so, in the USA, for example, the visas given to
domestic workers require them to work only for the employers who sponsor
them. Effectively, then, the actual experience of the worker may be similar to
that of a slave. The "civilized" state both limits and reinforces the power of the
employers, who may take advantage of this to the extent they choose.
BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK? THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DOMESTIC LABOUR 138
(2000) (emphasis added).
122 See VEENA VERMA, NORTH SOUTH INST., THE MEXICAN AND CARIBBEAN SEASONAL
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROGRAM: REGULATORY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, FARM INDUSTRY
LEVEL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM UNDER UNIONIZATION
(2003).
123 See generally Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy
Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human Capital, 40
BRANDEIS L. J. 967 (2002) (summarizing the use of U.S. immigration policy to satisfy labor
market demands).
124 See Preston, supra note 33 (reporting on claims of exploitation and the hunger strike by
Indian metalworkers recruited to the United States who allege that they had been trafficked into
the country). See also Hunger Strike, supra note 33 (providing an example of the interaction
between the restrictive U.S. immigration policy, the transnational labor market, and the creation
of legal dependence on the employer). The sad irony is inescapable in view of the U.S. stance as a
"global sheriff' that polices and punishes other states for infractions related to human
trafficking. See generally Janie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437 (2006) (analyzing the impetus
for U.S. extraterritorial anti-human trafficking efforts and their consequences). At the same
time, U.S. domestic immigration laws create the preconditions for human exploitation, including
the trafficking in humans.
125 See discussion infra Part I.B.1 regarding the projected economic benefits of labor
liberalization.
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that to allow the unconstrained movement of humans and to allow them to
share in the wealth of Western states might result in the West's loss of that
wealth and its advantages as a result of, among other things, lowered
compensation levels to Western labor providers. 126
Economic projections indicate that those fears are incorrect and based on
a misunderstanding of the consequences of labor liberalization. A number of
sources report that the liberalization of labor would result in increases in
global wealth and wellbeing as a result of the unleashing of global resources
that remain untapped. 127
III. THE STATUS Quo: EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS
Despite the reluctance of states to negotiate or commit to labor
liberalization within the context of trade liberalization, a robust transborder
trade in labor already exists. States, individuals, and groups are already
responding to the economic realities of existing transborder labor market
demand and available supply. Those responses take advantage of loopholes
and interstices in domestic immigration laws of individual states, including
state-encouraged and state-sanctioned transborder temporary employment
programs, to engage in both prohibited and permitted movements of labor
providers. 128
126 See NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 98, at 3 ("Due to highly politicized national
debates fueled by security concerns, labor protectionism, and concerns about collective identity,
commitments filed by countries under GATS Mode 4 (Movement of Natural Persons) have been
fewer and more limited than under the other modes of supply."). See also Walters, supra note 99,
at 106-07 (discussing misperceptions and political maneuverings surrounding the perceived
economic threats from labor liberalization).
127 See Winters et al., supra note 97, at 1138 (estimating that an increase in the movement of
labor equivalent to 3 percent of the unskilled and skilled workforces of developing countries
"would generate an estimated increase in world welfare by US $156 billion, shared fairly equally
between developed and developing countries"). Winters and his co-authors also note that earlier
projections about such liberalization report "large potential economic gains from labor mobility."
Id. Joy Katagekwa reports a similar finding from the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). See Kategekwa, supra note 100, at 3.
128 For example, the government of the Philippines encourages the education and transborder
movement of its nationals to provide labor in other countries. See Jason DeParle, Sending it All
Back Home: A Good Provider is One Who Leaves, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 22, 2007. See generally
RHACEL SALAZAR PARRENAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: WOMEN, MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC
WORK 51-59 (2001) (reporting on the Philippines' deployment of its "unprotected migrant
citizenry"). The governments of Jamaica and of Pakistan also provide government agency
support to programs that facilitate the temporary export of their nationals' labor to the United
States, Canada, and the Gulf States, respectively. See Luke Douglas, Thousands Clamour for
Overseas Hotel Jobs, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Jan. 24, 2008; 18 J'can Women Get Jobs as Seafood
Packers in Canada, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 8, 2008; Hospitality Workers Warned to Be on Best
Behaviour, JAMAICAN OBSERVER, Mar. 29, 2008 (describing warnings by the Jamaican Minister
of Labour and Social Security issued to Jamaican labor providers heading to the U.S. hospitality
industry; the Minister's address noted "that immediately upon discovery of unruly behaviour, it
will be an imposition of punishment with them being 'out' after the second strike."). Such
programs usually confer more limited benefits and rights to the individual transborder labor
providers than to their domestic employers. VERMA, supra note 122, at ix-xii, 32, 39
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The transnational labor market is framed by and arises within the
intricate interweaving and contradictions of multilevel legal regimes. The
institutions of the multilateral trading system have taken a hands-off
approach 129 while the domestic legal systems too often demonstrate
indifference to international human rights laws and deference to hard-edged
domestic immigration legal regimes. 130 Coupled with an international human
rights standard-setting system that is unenforceable (employing, for the most
part, publicity and naming-and-shaming to encourage compliance) 31 the
transborder labor market has become increasingly inhumane, stripping
migrants of legal personhood, while border crossings have become
increasingly dangerous.
The status quo in the transnational labor market is a system of
exploitation that is fatal to the poor, vulnerable, and unskilled, 132 existing
alongside a more flexible and open regime for highly skilled labor. The
contemporary transnational labor market is marked by the rhetoric of
exclusion and rejection of the foreign worker, coupled with legal guestworker
programs and lack of enforcement of applicable labor standards that together
facilitate the migrant worker's exploitation through commoditization and
dehumanization. 133 The lines between labor exploitation, migrant smuggling,
and human trafficking are not clear. However, it is clear that labor
exploitation and migrant smuggling are the seedbed from which human
trafficking grows.
(summarizing failure to protect rights of the migrant workers and the dominant role of
employers in setting applicable standards and policies for the Canadian program).
129 Labor and the movement of natural persons is the least liberalized area of multilateral trade
liberalization. Winters et al., supra note 97, at 1137; Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 247.
130 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (applying lower standards
when undocumented employees are injured at work). The operation of stringent immigration
laws also leads to violations of domestic civil rights laws and other legal protections. See ERIK
CAMAYD-FREIXAS, INTERPRETING AFTER THE LARGEST ICE RAID IN U.S. HISTORY: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT (2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national20080711
IMMIG.pdf (describing the conditions surrounding the criminal prosecution and sentencing of
undocumented immigrants seized in the raid of an Iowa meatpacking plant, and alleging
violations of fundamental rights of those seized, tried, and sentenced).
13, For discussion regarding the inadequacy of the human rights regime, see supra Part II.A.2.
132 For example:
Illegal migrants risk their lives to better themselves. Europeans are more
aware of Africans drowning in the summer holiday season, but boats are
wrecked all year round. In mid-December 51 migrants drowned off the Greek
island of Samos .... Mexicans dying in Arizona's desert rarely make
headlines anymore. And not a lot is heard about the 600,000 people a year,
perhaps more, who the UN says are trafficked and often forced into
prostitution. Bonded labor, too, is dismally common.
Open Up, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2008, at 5.
133 This may reflect conventional perceptions of the threat and inconvenience that would arise
from labor as bearers of human rights.
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A. The Transnational Market for Labor
Both Western and less developed countries participate in the transborder
trade in labor on the transnational labor market. 3 4 Some labor-rich
economies, whose comparative advantage is the availability of an untapped
labor supply, foster and support an extensive transnational trade in the labor
of their nationals through bilateral and multilateral agreements and/or
understandings (some longstanding) with labor-poor countries that need the
labor for the functioning of their domestic economies. 13 5 Those trading
arrangements, formal and informal, between labor-rich sending countries and
labor-poor host countries, rest upon a central premise. The migrant worker
will always be a creature, i.e., national, of his/her home country, except in
extraordinary circumstances where a path to legal residence and/or
citizenship in the host state may be created. To that end, it is intended that
the migrant worker may never achieve the status nor enjoy the rights of a
national of the host country, and may not demand from the host country the
rights and privileges arising from membership. 136
A striking feature of the majority of contemporary and post-World War II
state-sponsored attempts to cure domestic labor market disequilibrium is the
deployment of temporariness. Permanent outsider status is achieved through
the mechanism of imposed temporal restraints 137 and barriers to legal
transformation or assimilation of the outsider into the privileged citizenry.
During the colonial and imperial eras, the labor migration flows sanctioned
by dominant political entities were not characterized by mandatory
134 Pradip Bhatnagar, Liberalising the Movement of Natural Persons: A Lost Decade?, 27 WORLD
ECON. 459, 468 (2004) ("[Bjoth developed and developing countries are increasingly resorting to
ad hoc imports of foreign workers to solve the problem of domestic labour shortages in order to
sustain their economic growth.").
135 In countries such as the Philippines, the reliance on the transborder export of human labor
providers resulted from the dislocations attendant to incorporation of those countries into the
global economy-an incorporation fostered by application of the policies of global financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF') and the World Bank. See
PARRENAS, supra note 128, at 51.
136 The German guestworker program provides a useful example:
The main case of temporary foreign worker recruitment, or the 'guestworker'
system, was in the Federal Republic of Germany.... The system established
a clear distinction between the civil rights of foreigners and those of citizens.
Foreigners had no voting rights and, because their work and residence
permits usually tied them to a particular employer, they were forced to work
in the worst jobs in the worst conditions and could do little to improve these
conditions.
HAYTER, supra note 82, at 11-12.
137 At the extreme, permanent outsider status is also achieved through double temporariness.
See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guest-Worker Programs as
Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 465, 469-70 (2002) (discussing the "double
requirement of temporariness" of the U.S. H-2B visas-workers are temporarily present to fill
only temporary jobs).
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temporariness. For example, the massive flow of migrants from India to the
rest of the British colonial empire 138 did not mandate the return of the
migrant worker to the sending country.139 Today, against a backdrop of legal
recognition of international human rights, the migrant worker is made
vulnerable through exclusion from the more privileged status of "citizen-
national."140 Further opportunities for exploitation and conditions of
inequality are created in the formal and informal transnational labor market
as less powerful states transmit their unequal bargaining status to their
nationals. 141
138 Hayter explains:
The second major migration was of indentured or bonded labour, or
temporary slaves, from India and China, again to remedy the lack of cheap or
available labour in the places of destination. In theory the indentured
workers signed a contract with employers and labour agencies of their own
free will. In practice for most of them the choice was little greater than that
presented to slaves transported from Africa, and their contracts provided
them with no political or human rights. Thirty million indentured workers
left India during the colonial period and up to the First World War. They
provided a workforce for the mines and plantations of Burma, Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, Singapore, Mauritius, South Africa, Guyana and Jamaica.
HAYTER, supra note 82, at 9. Other destinations included Fiji, Trinidad, Kenya, and Uganda. See
U.K. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, UNFREE LABOUR: FAMILY HISTORY SOURCES FOR INDIAN INDENTURED
LABOUR OVERSEAS RECORDS INFORMATION 21 (2007), available at http://www.nationalarchives.
gov.uklcatalogue/RdLeaflet.asp?sLeafletID=400&j=l [hereinafter INDIAN INDENTURED].
139 An argument may be put forward that contemporary ethnic conflict in Fiji and Guyana, for
example, indicate that the return of 19th Century migrants should have been mandatory. Such a
stance is contrary to human rights ideals. In addition, such conflicts result where the assets of
the state are reserved to particular ethnic groups to the exclusion of others. Liberalization of
labor together with adherence to and enforcement of contemporary human rights and civil rights
protections should decrease such conflicts.
140 See discussion infra Parts III.A.4, III.B.1 (outlining the exploitative effects of temporal
restraints).
141 For further discussions on state transmission of inequality to their migrants, see infra notes
159-160, 187 and accompanying text. Worthy of further inquiry, but not fully explored in this
Article, is the relationship among the rise in concepts of national citizenship and the decline in
the acceptability (political and social) of legal and legally enforced racism, sexism, and other
forms of discrimination as mechanisms for maintaining otherness and exploitability, and the use
of the mechanism of temporariness to achieve the exploitation that human rights and civil rights
norms no longer overtly permit.
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1. States Trade in Human Labor 142
Although not openly characterized as a trade good, service, or market, the
transnational trade in human labor-a simultaneously legitimate and
illegitimate industry-is thriving. States that participate in this
transnational trade span the gamut of the development spectrum, from the
United States and Canada to the Philippines and Pakistan. While the United
States and Canada are net recipients of labor, labor-rich countries such as
the Philippines and Pakistan are net suppliers.
These examples of state participation in the transnational labor market
were selected for examination because each illuminates different aspects of
the market. The United States, the quintessential immigrant-receiving
country, has adopted a less welcoming attitude toward the entry of migrants
while simultaneously committing to liberalization of other factors of
production. On the one hand, the United States has taken the lead against
the egregious exploitation of human trafficking, and has employed the
rhetoric of civil and human rights. On the other hand, the guestworker
programs utilized to supply temporary workers to the U.S. domestic labor
market are fraught with types of exploitation similar to those endured by
trafficked persons. 143 Canada, also a traditional receiving country, is
perceived as a more sincere adherent to human rights norms and as more
welcoming than the United States. However, its guestworker programs also
foster and exhibit exploitation of the mobile human labor provider. The
Philippines was selected because of the centrality of labor exportation to its
development model and economic health. Pakistan's experience with labor
migration illustrates that labor movements are directed not only toward the
West, that labor migration and labor exploitation do not only affect females,
and that not only traditional sending countries are participating in this
market.
142 Some challenges may be raised to the characterization of inter-governmental labor supply
arrangements as "trade." While cash is not exchanged directly between the governments
involved, the arrangements fall within a broad definition of trade. Each of the sending and
receiving states receive both tangible and intangible benefits from the exchange of the sending-
state labor providers within the context of the program. For example, among other things, the
host receives a cheaper and more compliant workforce than might be readily available within its
borders. The sending state, on the other hand, receives the effects of remittances returned by the
labor providers, as well as the creation of employment opportunities for otherwise unemployed or
underemployed categories of workers. Benefits to the sending and receiving states accrue not
from legal ownership of the human labor providers, but from control over the providers and over
the labor supply arrangements. For an analysis of guestworker programs and their treatment of
labor as a commodity, see generally Ruben Garcia, Labor as Property: Guest Workers,
International "Trade, and the Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27 (2006).
143 For example, the lack of freedom of movement and limited ability to effectively enforce human
and/or civil rights through appeal to relevant authorities. See generally SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.splcenter.orgtpdf/static/SPLCguestworker.pdf [hereinafter CLOSE TO SLAVERY].
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a. The United States
The U.S. immigration regime has become more hostile to the permanent
entry of labor (permanent entry categories are dominated by family
reunification and other categories of migrants) than in other periods.144
However, the regime continues to include an active guestworker program, 145
which maintains a relatively lower profile than the more anti-immigrant
policies and rhetoric.
The largest and most significant of the United States' guestworker
programs, the Bracero program, which brought millions of temporary
Mexican farm workers to U.S. agricultural fields, ended in the 1960s. 146 The
H-1 and H-2 programs have continued. 147 Using the H-1B program, the
United States fruitlessly attempts to satisfy the domestic demand for skilled
transborder workers. Although Congress has adjusted the quota of such
workers in an attempt to keep up with demand, those adjustments have
generally been insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the domestic labor
market. 148 The inability of this state-interposed mechanism to respond
flexibly to the economic demands of the U.S. labor market may have
consequences for the health of the U.S. economy and its technological
leadership as well as for the unsanctioned entry of skilled and unskilled
human labor providers. 149
The H-2A and H-2B visas allow U.S. employers in low-paying seasonal
industries to satisfy their labor demands through the import of temporary
144 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What
Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 284, n.171 ("[F]amily
preference categories dominate the 'legal permanent resident' admissions categories, as well as
admissions more generally.").
145 Indeed, as noted by Professor Cristina Rodriguez: 'The allure of the temporary worker has
exerted a strong pull on [U.S.] labor-based admissions in particular. Today, more of the labor
needs of the United States are filled by workers on temporary visas than by lawful permanent
residents." Id. at 258.
146 For history and analysis of the Bracero program, see generally KITrY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE
STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992).
147 See DAVID GRIFFITH, AMERICAN GUESTWORKERS: JAMAICANS AND MEXICANS IN THE U.S.
LABOR MARKET 30-39 (2006) (describing the origins and evolution of temporary worker
programs in the United States, including the H-2 and the Bracero programs). See also id. at 7
(describing the differences between the H-2A and H-2B programs). H-2A visas are issued to
seasonal agricultural workers, while H-2B workers supply temporary labor to non-agricultural
industries, such as "seafood processing, shrimping, hotels, ornamental stone quarries, racehorse
stables, and forestry." Id.
148 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Many Visas Are Sought for Skilled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at A9
(describing the disparity between the number of HIB visa applicants and the number of such
visas issued annually pursuant to U.S. immigration law).
149 See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan & Nina Bernstein, Businesses Say New York's Clout is
Emigrating, With Visa Policies to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at B1; Nathan Thornburgh,
How Not to Treat The Guests, TIME, June 4, 2007 (discussing, inter alia, the inability of the
existing program to respond flexibly to labor demands).
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workers from the Caribbean and Mexico. 150 The industries to which the
majority of workers are destined are agriculture, hospitality/hotels, and
seafood packaging. 151 The U.S. guestworker program is characterized by
endemic exploitation of workers, a lack of accountability of employers, 152 and
privatization. Private recruiting companies act as the middlemen, finding
and transporting workers from their countries of origin to the host state
employer, 153 often with the assistance of the host governments.1 54 Other
mechanisms through which the United States acquires labor power in the
transborder labor market include the direct recruitment of foreign workers by
governmental units or by private parties deputized by the government. 155
Some examples include the targeted recruitment of teachers and nurses from
the Caribbean by the New York City school system. 156
150 GRIFFITH, supra note 147, at 30-31 (noting the program's increasing shift from Caribbean to
Mexican labor providers).
151 Id. at 7.
152 See id. at 68-74, 205-08. See generally CLOSE TO SLAVERY, supra note 143 (analyzing the
slavery-like conditions endured by foreign guestworkers in the United States).
153 For example, private recruiters in the United States advertise their services and workers on
the Internet. See CLOSE TO SLAVERY, supra note 143, at 9 ("U.S. employers almost universally
rely on private agencies to find and recruit guestworkers in their home countries..."). Sites like
www.get-a-worker.com, www.labormex.com, www.landscapeworker.com, and www.mexican-
workers.com advertise the availability of temporary workers. The use of recruiter middlemen,
who often use exploitative mechanisms, shields the governmental entities from direct obligation
and liability, making workers more vulnerable to exploitation, including trafficking. See, e.g., id.
at 32 ("Many large employers who rely on guestworkers increasingly are attempting to avoid
responsibility for unlawful practices by obtaining workers indirectly through a sub-contractor.
This use of labor brokers puts workers at greater risk of abuse and makes enforcement of their
rights even more difficult that it is already."). See also Steven Greenhouse, Low Pay and Broken
Promises Greet Guest Workers in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at Al (reporting on widespread
abuses in the U.S. guestworker programs and the increased vulnerability of workers when labor-
brokers are involved in recruiting them for work in the United States).
154 Both the host state and the home state are involved in vetting the workers prior to movement.
See Thornburgh, supra note 149 (describing the backlog in the U.S. consulates in Mexico). See
also PARRENAS supra note 128 (regarding the selection process for workers for the overseas
market). See infra Part III.A. 1.c-d.
155 Some European countries, for example. The United Kingdom recruits doctors and nurses from
Malawi because of its good healthcare system. See, e.g., Daniel Morris, Giving Aid With One
Hand, Taking MDs With The Other, COM, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.thestar.comI
printArticle/243777; Malawi: Donors and Gov't Pool Funds Against Brain Drain, INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, May 28, 2007, available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?
ReportId=72414.
156 See, e.g., Regional Education Ministers to Discuss Teacher Recruitment, JAMAICA OBSERVER,
May 27, 2002; Commonwealth Countries Reach Agreement on Teacher Recruitment, JAMAICA
OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2004.
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b. Canada
Canada, while appearing to have more welcoming immigration policies
than the United States overall, 15 7 also uses a temporary employment
program to satisfy seasonal demands for agricultural labor. The Canadian
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program allows for the recruitment of
workers from the Caribbean and Mexico to work on farms in Ontario,
Canada. 158
The Canadian program, unlike the U.S. H-2A and H-2B programs, does
not outsource the recruitment of workers. Instead, the governments of the
labor-rich sending states are actively involved in recruiting and vetting their
nationals for work in Canada's agricultural fields. 159 However, the Canadian
program is also characterized by exploitative conditions endured by workers,
dependence on the employer, and inadequate and often ineffective monitoring
by the governments involved. 160 The unequal bargaining positions of their
home states vis-h-vis the host state is replicated in the workers' relationship
with their employers, 161 further increasing their vulnerability.
157 See, e.g., Bruce Cheadle, Immigration Fuelling Canada's Growth, GUELPH MERCURY, Mar. 14,
2007 (discussing the growth in Canada's population as a result of high immigration rates, and
stating that "Canada's net migration, per capita, is among the highest in the world").
158 See VERMA, supra note 122, at 1-12 (describing the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Program ("CSAWP"), its history, rationale and institutional framework).
159 Describing the CSAWP as:
[A] "government to government" managed program of migration. Private
actors and any role they may have in the CSAWP are defined and regulated
by government .... Government agents from Mexico and the Caribbean act
as Government Agents in Canada between the workers and the Canadian
government and growers.
Id. at vii. See also id. at 43-45 (describing the vetting process performed by the sending states).
160 See id. at xiv (describing long hours and dangerous conditions, as well as exclusion from
Canadian domestic labor standards); id. at x, 32-39 (describing mechanisms such as "naming"
(selection of specific individual transborder workers by Canadian employers) and threatened
repatriation, through which employers' power over workers is maintained); id. at xiii (describing
"hands off 'approach" of provincial authorities); id. at xv (describing the inability of sending state
agents to effectively police and maintain housing conditions); id. at xi (describing reluctance of
sending state agents to too ardently represent workers' interest against the employer for fear of
losing the contract for their country).
161 Indeed, it is interesting to observe the mechanisms through which both the United States and
Canadian programs attempt to harness "competition," a centerpiece of free market theory. The
Canadian program fosters competition among sending state representatives, and the U.S.
program fosters competition among the private recruiters. Neither the United States nor the
Canadian program allows the worker to compete on an open market or forces employers to
compete, but instead maintains employer dominance over the worker. Such competition as the
system allows, then, serves to enhance the situation of host state capital to the detriment of the
sending state worker. Verma describes the competitive relationships among sending states
participating in the CSAWP as follows:
The Government Agents also ensure that their respective country's [sic]
receive as many placements as possible in order to maximize the return of
remittances. Combined with the employers [sic] right to select the supply
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According to Douglas S. Massey and J. Edward Taylor, "[r]ecognizing how
vital migrant remittances are to their economies, some labor-abundant
developing nations have designed and implemented policies to train and
place workers abroad and to harness more of the income they earn for
development."162 The Philippines and Pakistan are labor-rich sending states
that encourage and manage their nationals' participation in the transborder
labor market to foster domestic economic development. This mode of
economic development gives the sending state the benefit of the provision of
employment to the more entrepreneurial of its citizens and the multiplier
effects of the flow of remittances from the overseas workers into the domestic
economy. 163
c. The Philippines
The Philippine model of participation by the state in the transborder
labor market places Philippine nationals of all skill levels in both developed
and relatively wealthier developing nations. 164 So pervasive is this mode of
accessing the transborder labor market and the opportunities available in the
transnational economy that the Philippines is known to specialize in the
export of certain skills and professions. 165 In addition, the way of life of long-
term temporary transborder departure for work, followed by return, is
entrenched in family life166 and governmental systems. 167
country of workers, there is a competitive structure among the consulates.
This has been encouraged by the Canadian government. This structure
undermines the Government Agent's ability to pursue workers' grievances.
VERMA, supra note 122, at xi.
162 Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor, Introduction in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION:
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET 1 (Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor eds.,
2004).
163 See INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD), SENDING MONEY HOME:
WORLDWIDE REMITTANCE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2007) (reporting that US $300
billion was sent home to developing countries by nationals living abroad). According to the IFAD
study, US $14.6 billion, representing 12.5 percent of its GDP, was sent to the Philippines; and
US $6.2 billion, representing 4.5 percent of its GDP, was sent to Pakistan. Id.
164 See generally PARRENAS, supra note 128 (discussing and comparing the situation of mostly
skilled Philippine migrant women working as domestic servants in the United States and Italy).
See also id. at 51 ('The Philippine economy relies on the deployment of workers to ease high
unemployment and underemployment rates, provide workers with additional skills training, and
generate foreign currency from the remittances of foreign-employed workers.").
165 For example, Filipina nurses travel worldwide, including to the United States and to the Gulf
States, while Filipina domestic workers flow to the Gulf States and Europe. See generally
CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY, EMPIRE OF CARE: NURSING AND MIGRATION IN FILIPINO AMERICAN
HISTORY (2003).
166 See PARRENAS, supra note 128, at 80-196. See also DeParle, supra note 128 (describing the
effect of the migratory model on familial and other societal structures).
167 See, e.g., DeParle supra note 128 (describing the focus of the Philippine government on the
outward migration of its citizens in search of employment). See also Kevin O'Neil, Labor Export
as Government Policy: The Case of the Philippines, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 1 (2004) (describing
the formation of the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration "to provide contract labor
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The Philippine government is committed to protecting its nationals who
work outside the country and to welcoming them as heroes upon their
return. 168 Nevertheless, stories abound of the exploitative experiences of
Philippine nationals working abroad. These experiences, much like the
exploitation encountered in the U.S. and Canadian contexts, stem from the
legal empowerment and dominance conferred to the employer-exploiter by
the institutional frameworks of the temporary worker programs under host
state domestic law and by the temporariness and dependence on the
employer that is required by the programs. Indeed, the experiences of some
overseas workers whose movements were facilitated by the relevant
governments are often no different from the experiences of the typical
trafficked person. 169
d. Pakistan
Like the Philippines, Pakistan is labor-rich but its domestic economy is
unable to provide sufficient economic opportunities and employment for its
domestic labor providers. Pakistan has therefore outsourced to a quasi-
governmental entity, the Pakistan Overseas Employment Corporation, the
task of recruiting and vetting Pakistani nationals, matching them with
employers, and exporting them on the transnational labor market.17
0
Unlike the Philippines, the majority of Pakistan's overseas workers are
destined for the Gulf States 171 and to other developing countries that are
wealthier than Pakistan. Such workers often endure exploitative
directly to employers" and the increase in the migrant protection focus of the agency following
publicity surrounding exploitative conditions).
168 See Ryszard Cholewinski, International Labour Law and the Protection of Migrant Workers:
Revitalizing the Agenda in the Era of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF
LABOUR LAW 409, 431-32 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006) (describing some of the
migrant protection mechanisms adopted by the Philippine government); see also DeParle, supra
note 128.
169 See DeParle, supra note 128 (reporting tacit complicity in and later condemnation by the
Philippine government in the trafficking of Philippine nationals into the Japanese sex industry);
see also Preston, supra note 33 (regarding trafficking charges made by U.S.-based legal
transborder labor providers from India).
170 See Overseas Employment Corporation, The Official Gateway of the Government of Pakistan,
www.oec.gov.pk/English/en-about.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) ('The Corporation is mandated
to promote employment of professionals, highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled and un.skilled
manpower in foreign countries. In fulfillment of its mandate, the Corporation has so far provided
more than 1,28,000 [sic] workers to foreign employers in the public and private sector from 53
different countries of the world.").
171 See Fred Arnold & Nasra Shah, Asian Migration to the Middle East, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV.
294-318 (1984) (noting that of the 2 million-3 million Asian workers in the Gulf States, 800,000
of each came from Pakistan and India). See also Abid Qaiyum Suleri & Kevin Savage,
Remittances in crises: a case study from Pakistan 12 (HPG Background Paper, 2006) (reporting
that in the subject areas of study, 64 percent, 32 percent, and 10 percent of emigrants reported
living in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Muscat, respectively). See also id. at 6 (noting
Pakistani government report on Pakistan's expatriate population of approximately seven million
located "in rich countries of the West and the Persian Gulf').
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conditions. 172 However, like the Philippines, Pakistan provides temporary
workers of all skill levels to the domestic labor markets of the host states. 173
Also like the Philippines, the temporary migrant way of life has become
entrenched in Pakistani family and social life, giving rise to concerns
regarding the effects on family members left behind. 174 In sharp contrast to
the Philippines, the gender of exported workers is almost 100 percent male,
stemming, perhaps, from Pakistan's dominant culture and religion, which
frowns upon women working outside the home. 175
The official mechanism of transborder movement is inadequate to meet
the pressures of Pakistan's economy and population. As a consequence,
significant numbers of Pakistanis (and Afghanis) are smuggled and trafficked
to destinations in the West, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central
Asia, as well as within Pakistan's domestic market. 176
The implications of heavy state involvement in the export of domestic
labor are daunting. Some potential dangers include the subordination of the
sending state's education system to ensure the steady supply of transborder
labor, economic dependence of the sending state on remittances, which may
also become state-controlled, and government control of migration
opportunities.
2. Capital Trades in Labor (Human Capital)
Capital enthusiastically participates in the transborder labor market.
While states primarily manage trade in the labor of their unskilled nationals,
capital (e.g., multinational corporations) trades principally in skilled labor.
This trade is facilitated by both the multilateral trading regime and the
domestic law of individual states. The GATS distinguishes between "natural
172 See, e.g., Christy Hoover, Migrant Workers Exploited While U.A.E. Prospers, ETHICAL
TRAVELER.ORG, Mar. 2007, http://www.ethicaltraveler.org/news-story.php?id=158. But see Jason
DeParle, Fearful of Restive Foreign Labor, Dubai Eyes Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Al
(describing exploitation of migrant workers and pressures for reform).
173 See Overseas Employment Corporation, supra note 170 (describing the occupation/categories
of Pakistanis for whom the OEC had found employment abroad, including surgeons, nurses,
engineers and IT professionals, among others).
174 See Arnold & Shah, supra note 171, at 306-07 (discussing some of the effects on wives and
children of migrant workers).
15 See, e.g., Sally Baden, The Position of Women in Islamic Countries: Possibilities, Constraints
and Strategies for Change, INST. OF DEV. STUDIES 28 (1992), available at www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/
reportsre4c.pdf (discussing low rates of employment among women in Islamic societies). See also
Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 247 ("Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan often prohibit
women from taking jobs abroad as domestic workers.").
176 See Khalid Koser, Why Migrant Smuggling Pays, 46 INVL MIGRATION REV. 3, 7 (2008). Table 1
depicts various types of human trafficking and migrant smuggling that originate in Pakistan.
Koser notes that "at the government level, irregular migrants are often viewed as just as
valuable a source of remittances as legal emigrants and are not necessarily viewed as
problematic." Id.
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persons" and "juridical persons," 177 and imposes restrictions on the provision
of services (labor) by natural persons, which are not similarly imposed on
juridical persons. 178 The institutional framework of the GATT/WTO and
limitations on the obligations that member states assume or accept confer to
capital the ability to trade freely and to obtain the desired skill profile of
human labor providers. 179
The trade is conducted as a transnational transfer within a corporate
entity or among related corporate entities, or through the relocation of capital
from one state to another. 180 Further, capital may depend, for its success and
profitability, on the ability to price-discriminate among competing domestic
markets. Corporations search transnationally for skilled labor and, through
relocation of production facilities, have the ability to discriminate against
relatively immobile, unskilled, and semi-skilled labor.18 1  Capital also
participates through privately owned entities that recruit and supply the
skilled and unskilled labor that is sought in an individual domestic market
but only readily available in a transborder location. Examples include the
private recruitment entities who supply the H-2A and H-213 temporary
workers who are allowed to enter under U.S. immigration law. 8 2
It is fundamental to the interests and profitability of at least some forms
of capital that the disjuncture between the multilateral trading system and
177 Article XXVIII of the GATS defines juridical persons as "any legal entity duly constituted or
otherwise organized under applicable law, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether
privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint
venture, sole proprietorship or association." GATS, supra note 21, art. XXVIII.
178 For example, as revealed by Steve Charnovitz's comparison of WTO members' obligations to
liberalize labor and capital, while only the temporary presence of natural persons as labor
suppliers is provided for under the GATS, capital is freed from temporal constraints on
residence. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 96.
179 As discussed in this Article supra Part II.B.1, the commitments made thus far by WTO
members are limited to highly skilled labor providers and, in some cases, to intra-company
transfers. See also Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 24. Reporting that:
The existing Mode 4 commitments by over one hundred countries are heavily
tilted toward high-skilled persons. About 42 percent of horizontal
commitments . . . relate to intra-company transferees; 28 percent relate to
executives, managers and specialists; 13 percent are visitors for sales
negotiations, 10 percent are other business visitors. The remaining percent
are independent contractors and others.
Id. It is clear from this summation that liberalization fulfilling the needs and desires of for-profit
juridical persons are privileged by existing GATS provisions and member state commitments.
180 Thus, trading in higher-cost labor for lower-cost models.
181 See, e.g., William J. Holstein, The American Multinational, Unbowed, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2008, at BU5 (reviewing GLoBALITY by Harold L. Sirkin et al., which celebrates the ability of
American corporations to compete transnationally for human capital). See generally Special
Feature, Working Borders: Linking Debates About Insourcing and Outsourcing in Capital and
Labor, 40 TEX. INTL L.J. 691 (2005) (discussing interconnections between the transnational flows
of labor and capital).
182 For a discussion of private labor recruiters in the United States, see supra note 153.
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domestic immigration laws should continue. This Article argues, however,
that maintenance of the status quo does not best serve the interests of states
or individual human labor providers.
3. Humans Trade in Human Labor
Finally, human smuggling and human trafficking arise and grow in
response to the labor market disequilibrium and other economic forces.18 3
Would-be migrants who are unable to access state-sanctioned mechanisms
that allow movement are forced to utilize the services of potentially
exploitative middlemen in order to traverse the increasingly barricaded
borders of nation states. 8 4 The interposition of domestic immigration laws
and policies, including temporariness, and permanent second-class status,
creates vulnerability to trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Temporal
and portability constraints create exploitability and vulnerability, which
extend to both legal and illegal transborder labor providers.
4. Characteristics of the Transnational Labor Market
The transnational labor market is characterized by the illegality and
temporariness that is assigned by states to mobile human labor providers.
While the demands of the globalized transnational economy require the
movement of labor from one domestic economy to another, individual nations'
domestic immigration law and the near-silence of multilateral trade law18 5
barricade domestic economies from access by transborder labor providers.
States, capital, and humans work to supply the market from within the
interstices and gaps created by formal and informal programs, "illegal"
transborder movement, and bilateral agreements and arrangements. 8
6
183 See Emmert, supra note 69, at 155 ("Restrictive rules in the E.U. and U.S. have created large
numbers of illegal workers and thriving industries exploiting their unprotected status"). See
generally Chac6n, supra note 42 (discussing the interaction between restrictive immigration laws
and migrant smuggling and human trafficking industries).
184 For example, Indian transborder labor providers who used the services of middlemen to
legally enter the United States allege that they were trafficked. See Preston, supra note 33; see
also Workers from India Sue, Charging 'Modern-day Slavery,' CNN, Mar. 11, 2008, available at
http:/h2bpresswatch.wordpress.com/2008/03/1 1/cnn-workers-from-india-sue-charging-modern-
day-slavery/; Indian Men in U.S. 'Slave' Protest, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/7316130.stm. Guatemalan landscapers who used middlemen to
enter illegally into the United States have made similar claims. Nina Bernstein, Suit to Charge
That Nursery Mistreated Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at B2.
185 That is, the failure of the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system to address the
liberalization of labor. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
186 For example, the H-2B temporary labor system in the United States and Canada's CSAWP
are facilitated by intergovernmental arrangements or agreements. See GRIFFITH, supra note 147,
at 32 (discussing the British West Indies Temporary Labor Program); see also VERMA, supra note
122, at 13-16 (describing the Memoranda of Understanding between Canada and Mexico, and
between Canada and individual Caribbean states, establishing the legal framework for
transborder supply of temporary workers).
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However, these means of access are merely narrow exceptions to the non-
access default mode. The human labor providers are intentionally cabined
and constrained by their dependence on employers, retention of the sending
state's unequal bargaining power and status, 18 7 and restricted access to the
applicable civil rights regime of the host state. The disjuncture and
disequilibrium foster illegal movement-both migrant smuggling and human
trafficking-and result in the vulnerability of human labor providers to
trafficking and other forms of human exploitation. 188
Other characteristics of the status quo in the transnational labor market
include a two-tier system that privileges skilled labor 8 9 and the imposition of
unequal status on both the legal and illegal migrant worker. This inferior
status is based on temporariness and lack of access to real legal redress. The
conflicts between the international human rights conception of humans and
the multilateral trade regime's failure to fully address legal labor mobility 90
foster the vulnerability and exploitability of the individual would-be mobile
human labor provider.
B. Proposed Reforms
The disequilibrium in the transnational labor market has not gone
unnoticed. Confronted with the disjuncture in legal regimes and the
disequilibrium in the labor market, together with the consequent exploitation
of human labor providers, several suggestions for change have emerged. The
proposals for reform include (1) expansion and enhancement of domestic
guestworker programs, (2) liberalization of labor within the context of
regional trade arrangements, and (3) expansion of GATS Mode 4. None of the
suggested reforms proffered thus far would address both the disjuncture and
contradiction of the overarching legal systems-trade liberalization and
domestic immigration law-nor adequately undermine the economic
187 See GRIFFITH, supra note 147, at 40 (describing the reluctance of government representatives
from small Caribbean states to pursue redress for workers' grievances). Griffith reports that one
of the representatives explained his quandary as follows: "If I advocate too hard for that worker,
I'm liable to lose that placement to Mexico or Jamaica." Id.
188 While the United States has led the charge, internationally, against human trafficking, some
allege that U.S. military contractors in Iraq utilized trafficked labor to build the new U.S.
embassy facility and in other capacities. See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, U.S. Investigates Firm
Building Embassy in Iraq, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2007, at Al; Cam Simpson, Iraq War Contractors
Ordered to End Abuses, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 2006.
189 This privileged status is given to skilled workers despite the comparatively greater demand
for unskilled labor in the domestic economies of high skilled post-industrialization states. See,
e.g., Kategekwa, supra note 100. States and capital perceive that allowing the access of skilled
labor may create more wealth and benefits for the domestic economies and polity of their states,
and ignore the needs that would be filled by and the benefits that would accrue from the
liberalization of all labor. See discussion supra Part II.B (regarding the projections of the
economic growth benefits that would be harnessed through the liberalization of labor).
190 Together with the immigration law and protectionist view of the migrant as a threatening
profit or benefit-devouring Pac-Man-like economic unit.
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foundations of the human-to-human exploitation of which trafficking in
humans is among the most egregious.
1. Expansion and Enhancement of Guestworker Programs
Prior to September 11, 2001, the momentum was growing to expand and
enhance guestworker programs in the United States. Much of the impetus
behind these proposals, supported by various interest groups and by
President George W. Bush, 191 was the U.S. economy's unmet demand for
unskilled labor stemming from the conflict between the labor market's
demands and the United States' restrictive immigration laws. An enhanced
and expanded guestworker program was seen as a mechanism to regularize
existing migration and to more closely align the demands of the economy
with the flow of incoming labor providers. Discussion and support for such
expansion and enhancement re-emerged in 2006, both from the White House
and in the reform proposals submitted by Senators John McCain and Edward
Kennedy. 192
In her analysis of transborder labor, Professor Jennifer Gordon
summarizes some features proposed by advocates of guestworker programs to
ameliorate concerns about the programs' risks of exploitation:
The visa would need to be portable, rather than tied to a
particular employer, because the potential for exploitation
increases dramatically once an employer controls a worker's
immigration status. The program would have to provide guest
workers with full rights in the workplace, including the right
to unionize, and it would need to contain multiple
enforcement mechanisms for those rights, including access to
federally funded legal service attorneys. It would have to
allow guest workers to be accompanied by their families.
Finally-and most controversially-most insist that it would
have to create a path to permanent residence, permitting
guest workers who wished to become permanent residents to
apply for a green card after a time in temporary status. So
long as these conditions are met, pro-guest worker unions say,
it is far better to have a legal population of workers than one
hidden in the shadows. 193
Addressing the disequilibrium and disjuncture in the U.S. labor market,
Professor Howard F. Chang analyzed the implications of the expansion of
U.S. guestworker programs, pointing to safeguards that should be
191 See Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 219. See also Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor
Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 508 (2007).
192 Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 224, n.12.
193 Gordon, supra note 191, at 558.
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implemented in order for the programs to satisfy liberal ideals.19 4 Because
discrimination against transborder workers would continue and because the
consequent inequality conflicts with liberal ideals, Professor Chang
acknowledged that the expansion of programs that grant temporary access
would be the second best alternative to open access for migrant labor. 195
Nevertheless, Professor Chang pointed out that, given the current political
climate and attitudes toward immigration, such expansion would be more
feasible than open entry to foreign laborers. 196
In support of this hypothesis, Professor Chang asserted that temporary or
other limited access is preferable to current policies of exclusion.197 He also
argued that concerns regarding further prospective entrenchment of
exploitation as a result of expansion of temporariness would be allayed in the
United States. Because the birthright citizenship provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 198 does not allow for the inheritance of
temporary status by the U.S.-born children of such guestworkers, Chang
argued that any exploitation resulting from temporariness would not be
perpetuated. 199
Pursuant to Professor Chang's analysis, an expanded U.S. guestworker
program could be enhanced through "liberalizing or eliminating labor
certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions on the duration of
guestworker employment or on their stays in the United States. ' 20 0 In
addition, pursuant to his proposal, other revisions could include removing the
restrictions on the industries and types of employment to which guestworkers
194 See generally Chang, supra note 137.
195 Id. at 475, 478.
196 Id. at 467-69.
197 Id. at 477-80.
198 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
199 Chang, supra note 137, at 473. In this regard, U.S. law contrasts with those of other receiving
countries, which have failed to confer status on children of guestworkers. In Germany, for
example:
[alithough settled and maybe even born in Germany, most of those who came
to the country under the gastarbeiter system are not eligible for German
citizenship, which is based on the principle of ius sanguinis. A baby born in
Germany of 'Turkish" parents (who themselves were born in Germany) is not
represented in official statistics as a birth, but as a migrant of one day's stay.
Under current legislation, were the baby in fifteen years time, say, to commit
what the German government deemed an offence, the child and parents
would be liable for deportation. Indeed, the birth of the baby itself might
constitute a reason for deportation, since migrants have to prove that they
occupy a minimum number of square metres per residence.
ANDERSON, supra note 121, at 183.
20 Chang, supra note 137, at 469-70.
Fall 20091
TRANSNA TIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
would have access and, crucially, the addition of the freedom to leave a
specific employer and seek alternative employment without violating the
terms of the guestworker's visa. 201 Professor Chang contended that such
expansion and enhancement of the program would benefit the economies of
both the United States and the sending countries as well as the economic
prospects of individual guestworkers, while increasing the workers'
protection from exploitation. 202
Newly-elected U.S. President Barack Obama has not yet addressed the
comprehensive immigration reforms proposed in 2007. However, if President
Obama's Administration does address such reforms, the proposals regarding
guestworker programs remain on the table as a possible, albeit flawed and ad
hoc, mechanism to resolve the U.S. domestic labor market disequilibrium. 20 3
2. Liberalization of Labor Within Regional Trade Agreements
Another suggested model for dealing with the disjuncture and
disequilibrium in the transnational labor market is the liberalization of labor
within the context of regional trade arrangements. 204 1 have argued
elsewhere in favor of regional labor liberalization as a second best alternative
and one that is more politically feasible than the prospect of multilateral
labor liberalization. 20 5 There, I also argued that the factors in favor of such
liberalization are strengthened where the member states are geographically
contiguous or proximate. 20 6 Further, extant examples of labor liberalization
within the context of regional trade arrangements, such as the European
Union, may provide potential guidance to implementation methodologies and
the flaws of such programs.
Pursuant to this proposal, member states of regional trade arrangements
that purport to liberalize trade should include the liberalization of labor as a
subject of their legal instruments. The quintessential example of such
liberalization is the European Union, which has removed many barriers to
the movement of nationals of its member states within EU borders. Other
examples of such attempted liberalization include the Agreement Between
201 See id. at 470-71 (also arguing that freedom to leave the employer would help to protect
workers from abusive situations).
202 Id. at 480.
203 For a strong criticism of guestworker programs based on their commodification of human
beings and their labor, see Garcia, supra note 142. Professor Garcia opines that "[t]heir
inherently temporary nature makes guestworkers unable to enforce their legal rights." Id. at 28.
204 Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that the GATS might use as a model the
liberalization of labor attained within some regional trade arrangements. See Winters et al.,
supra note 97, at 1152 (suggesting multilateral use of the NAFTA model).
205 See generally Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 7 (arguing that regional trade
arrangements in the Western Hemisphere have neglected the liberalization of labor, but that the
neglect can and should be remedied).
206 Id. at 85, 108-09.
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Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership
("JPEPA"), a treaty executed by the two governments, but not yet ratified by
the Philippine legislature. 2 7 The trade agreement provides, among other
things, for the liberalized movement of certain categories of Philippine
professionals to Japan, so long as specified certification requirements are
fulfilled. 208 Other regional trade arrangements that have made incremental
steps toward the liberalization of labor among member states include the
Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") and the Common Market of the
Southern Cone ("MERCOSUR"). 20 9
3. Expansion of Mode 4 of the GATS
The proposals for expansion of the scope of GATS Mode 4210 take the
following forms: creation of a GATS visa; expansion of the concept of service
supplier; and expansion of the breadth and depth of commitments by member
states. For example, Ryan Walters has suggested that the United States
should champion the introduction and expansion of GATS visas that would
provide multilateral transborder access to visa-bearers. 211 The benefits of
such visas would include the expansion of the number and type of workers
who possess the ability to undertake legal movement in response to
transborder stimulil2 2 and the streamlining of administrative barriers to
entry.213 An alternate proposal would more closely link "trade and.., labor"
concerns by offering enhanced labor liberalization in return for recognition
and enforcement of minimum labor standards. 214
Others suggest an expansion of the concept of a service supplier under
the GATS, 2 15 so that the number and types of employment and industries
207 See, e.g., Veronica Uy, Proposed 'Conditional Concurrence' on JPEPA Hit, INQUIRER.NET, July
18, 2008 (discussing the Philippine legislature's opposition to ratification of the proposed treaty).
208 The JPEPA would lower barriers to the movement of some categories of Philippine nationals
to Japan, so long as specified certification requirements were fulfilled. See Agreement Between
Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., ch. 9, Sept.
9, 2006. Other categories that would be liberalized include intra-corporate transferees and short-
term business visitors. Id. ch.7.
209 See Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 7, at 90-92 (discussing the treatment of
labor liberalization by CARICOM and MERCOSUR).
210 A number of scholars have written in favor of expansion of Mode 4 of the GATS. See, e.g.,
Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 250; Winters et al., supra note 97; Bhatnagar, supra note 134;
Walters, supra note 99 (advocating for the United States to promote the global standardization of
a GATS visa system).
211 See Walters, supra note 99, at 116.
212 Id.
213 Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 250.
214 See Emmert, supra note 69, at 154-56.
215 For example, the inclusion of foreign natural persons who are employed by domestic firms.
See, e.g., Winters et al., supra note 97, at 1153.
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covered by its provisions would increase. 216 Yet others have proposed
increasing liberalization of labor by expanding the commitments made by
member states to include already existing ad hoc guestworker programs and
subcontracting service arrangements. 21 7 Expansion of any of these categories
would increase the number of human labor providers whose transborder
movement is legally facilitated.
C. Critiques of Proposed Reforms
Each of the proposed reforms offers the prospect of increased legal
movement of human labor providers in response to transborder economic
incentives. For example, if an expanded guestworker program were adopted
unilaterally by each WTO member state, the effects on labor might be similar
to those anticipated from the multilateral liberalization proposed in this
Article. However, such individual adoptions would lack harmony; the scope of
each individual domestic program would differ, as would the protections
offered to individual labor providers.
In addition, the proposed reforms suffer from a number of flaws that
would create obstacles to the multilateral labor liberalization proposed by
this Article. That is, the reforms offer the prospect of continuing the failures
of conceptualization and the economic disequilibrium that characterize the
contemporary transnational labor market. As a result, the existing
preconditions for exploitation, including the traffic in human beings, would
continue. The proposed reforms offer the continued interposition of non-
omniscient states obstructing market forces even as they attempt to respond
to those forces. In addition, the proposals maintain the structures and
mechanisms of exploitation, and continue to recognize and facilitate
inadequate agency in individual human labor providers.
1. Continuation of Existing Disjunctures
Each of the proposed reforms would continue the disjunctures identified
in this Article. They do not recognize or enforce the equal status of labor as a
factor of production under economic and trade theories. Further, they
perpetuate the interposition of the state to interpret the demands of the
market. For example, the guestworker program expansion, which prior to
September 11, 2001, had gained some political traction, including the support
of President Bush, 218 would have been limited to Mexican human labor
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., id. at 1153-54. To date, GATS commitments made by individual WTO member
states have been limited to highly skilled individuals subject to transfer requests by MNCs.
Solomon, supra note 89, at 112. See also Kategekwa, supra note 100, discussing Least Developed
Country ("LDC") proposals regarding expansion of commitments to include additional sectors,
industries and skill levels.
218 See Press Release, White House, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,
Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
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providers. Such temporary worker programs do not offer a permanent
structural solution. Instead, they provide examples of the inefficiency of the
interposition of domestic policymaking and objectives into the global labor
market as well as sclerotic bureaucratic implementation. This inefficiency is
exemplified by the gap between the number of available visas and number of
applicants for highly skilled visas for immigration to the United States.
2 19
Like the guestworker programs, the proposed and actual experimentation
with labor liberalization in the context of regional trade arrangements can
only be transitional. As demonstrated by the European Union's experience,
the liberalization within regional trade arrangements serves to move the
border outward, but the perspective is essentially as inward-looking as was
the status quo. 220 The EU experience with human trafficking is stark and
salutary: continuing, higher barriers to outsiders, such as non-EU
nationals, 221 leads to greater levels of vulnerability and of trafficking of those
ineligible "others."222 If human trafficking is to be attacked multilaterally,
http://web.archive.org/web/20040110025417[http:/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20
040107-3.html; see also Michael A. Fletcher & Darryl Fears, Bush Pushes Guest-Worker
Program, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A02.
219 See supra notes 147-148 (discussing the mismatch between the number of workers needed
and requested by U.S. employers and the number of visas issued by authorities).
220 Instead of looking inward to the territory and interests of the state, policymakers look inward
to the territory and interests of the region. See, e.g., Jan Silva, EU Sets Rules for Deporting
Illegals, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 19, 2008, at A9; Caroline Brothers, EU Passes Tough Migrant
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O8/06/19/world/
europe/19migrant.html?partner=rssnyt&emc-rss.
221 Ginette Verstraete, Technological Frontiers and the Politics of Mobility in the European
Union, in UPROOTINGS/REGROUNDINGS: QUESTIONS OF HOME AND MIGRATION 225, 233 (Sarah
Ahmed et al. eds., 2003):
What mediates the Union's "four freedoms" of movement is the contradictory
concept of a European space without internal borders, inhabited by a subject
entitled to absolute mobility only insofar as he or she is firmly territorialized
and identifiable as the national subject from a participating state. Mobility in
Europe is without internal frontiers only to the extent that this limitless travel
is firmly grounded in national territory and national identity. It is the nation
state which grants or withholds the citizenship that allows the individual to
go/live/work elsewhere in the EU, thereby relinquishing some of its powers
over those citizens while extending its social divisions on a European scale.
Id. (emphasis added).
222 See, e.g., id. at 229:
With the free movement of goods and citizens in a European space without
frontiers came the problem of how to detain those who, as non-E.U. citizens
"sans papiers" posed a threat to this borderless territory. In other words, new
frontiers had to be implemented to be able to distinguish between Europeans
and non-Europeans, and between (authorized) travel and (unauthorized)
migration. The freedom of mobility for some (citizens, tourists, business
people) could only be made possible through the organized exclusion of others
forced to move around as illegal "aliens", migrants, or refugees. So with the
production of a mobile citizenship in a Europe without (symbolic and literal)
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and exploitation not merely shunted outside of individual state borders or to
internally located "others," the EU example indicates that a multilateral
labor liberalization solution is preferable to a regional solution. Incentives for
unsanctioned transborder movement will continue outside the borders of the
regional trade arrangements. Those excluded from the limited number of
mobile categories defined in regional treaties will continue to attempt to
enter, and to be vulnerable to exploitation.
Further, domestic guestworker or temporary labor programs, no matter
the specifics of their institutional framework, have historically failed in their
dual purposes of filling a temporary demand for labor and stemming the
inward flow of illegal movement into the territory of the state. 223 Instead,
experience indicates that guestworker programs will achieve the opposite
effect.224
2. Trade Diversion
A regional labor liberalization solution will exhibit the trade diversion
flaws of regional trade arrangements. 225 To the extent that labor is
liberalized in a covered region, human labor providers who, under a
multilateral labor liberalization framework, might have been better
compensated outside that region may instead be limited in their option to
seek "legal" economic opportunities. Further, capital may be attracted to the
larger pool of liberalized labor within the regional trade arrangement to the
detriment of equally qualified and otherwise competitive labor located
outside the borders of a particular regional trade arrangement.
Nevertheless, as a second best alternative in a non-ideal world, and to
overcome social and political barriers through the lens of experience, member
states in regional trade arrangements should be encouraged to experiment
with the liberalization of labor.
"internal frontiers" came the tightening up of checks for immigrants and
refugees at the "external borders."
Id.
223 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 191, at 560 ("As a historical matter, guest worker programs in
the United States and Europe have led to increased migration, including undocumented
migration."). See also Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 221 ("As studies of guest worker programs
consistently reveal, however, though a guest worker program may address labor market
demands, it will do so at the risk of compounding the illegal immigration problem and
perpetuating the poor treatment of migrant workers.").
224 See Gordon, supra note 191, at 560.
225 See, e.g., Helena Marques, Migration Creation and Diversion in the EU: Are CEECs
Immigrants Crowding Out the Rest?, (Loughborough Univ. Discussion Paper No. 2005-01, 2005)
(posing this question with respect to the European Union, and analyzing empirical data). The
debate regarding the trade diversion or trade promotion effects of regional trade agreements has
generated a great deal of scholarly thought. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, PTAs: The Wrong Road,
27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 865, 869 (1995).
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3. Conflict with Liberal/Human Rights Values
Other concerns include the proposed reforms' continued conflict with
human rights and liberal ideals.
a. Continued Opportunities for Exploitation
According to Professor Cristina Rodriguez, safeguards offered by
proponents of expanded and enhanced guestworker programs perpetuate the
fundamental inequality in transborder labor relationships that facilitates
exploitation (including the exploitation designated as "human trafficking").
Professor Rodriguez notes that:
On the face of things, guest worker programs might seem to
promote reciprocity. The receiving society has engineered for
itself and the guest worker an apparent bargain. Workers
send money home they otherwise would not have had, and the
receiving society saves as well .... [However,] [b]y creating a
temporary laboring class without full participation rights, or
even the prospect of full participation rights, such programs
introduce opportunities for exploitation and inequalities into
social, political, and economic relations that are unacceptable
in a democratic society that depends on the ongoing consent of
its subjects and an absence of castes.226
The balance of power will remain with the employer 227 or the state228 so
that transborder labor providers will remain exploitable.
b. Permanent "Other"-ness
Guestworker programs create a permanent underclass. As noted by
Professor Gordon, even if individual workers change, the programs provide
for legal affirmation of the inferiority and exploitability of a specified class-
one whose individual members may change. 229 That affirmation rests upon
the fungibility of the human labor providers, and maintains their
exploitability. Moreover, if the guestworkers are racially or ethnically "other"
than the receiving society, historical and contemporary experiences
226 Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 281-82.
227 See discussion, supra Parts II.A.1.a, b.
228 Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 283 (noting "the power of the state looms tyrannically over
guest workers in the form of the constant threat of deportation ... ").
229 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 191, at 561 ("From a societal perspective, it is not an answer to
concerns about second-class citizenship that any one migrant's time in that status may be brief.
The class itself is permanent, even if its composition changes over the years.").
Fall 20091
TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
demonstrate that racist attitudes will develop and become entrenched based
on the guestworkers' inferior and subordinate status under the program. 230
c. Perpetuation of Involuntary "Temporariness"
Finally, instead of allowing human labor providers the choice to react
freely to economic realities, guestworker programs are an ad hoc solution to a
systemic problem. 23 1 Such programs perpetuate constrained temporariness,
subordinating human goals, desires, and economic activity to the state's
interpretation of its economic needs. The autonomy and agency of the human
labor provider continue to be subject to the interposition of national political
and economic policy, which is too often misguided and shortsighted. The labor
provider continues to be temporary, instead of having the option to remain
permanently.
d. Inadequacy of Coverage
Despite calls for enhancement and expansion of the GATS Mode 4 (which
applies to the movement of natural persons to provide transborder services),
the GATS is fundamentally ill-equipped to fulfill the role of liberalizing labor
that would be provided by the General Agreement on Trade in Labor
proposed by this Article. 232 GATS Mode 4, due to its internal temporal
constraints, is inadequate to the task of liberalizing labor. As stated by
Solomon, the GATS Mode 4 covers only "a subset of a subset of a subset" of
the transnational labor market.233 The GATS encapsulates WTO member
states' negotiated agreement regarding liberalization of trade in services. The
human labor provider who has not secured transborder employment, who, in
fact, is moving transnationally in search of such employment, falls outside of
the GATS' auspices. 234 In order to truly undermine the economic foundations
of human trafficking, human labor must be as liberalized as the other factors
of production, and that liberalization must include more than the temporary
movement of labor.
230 The inferior status and exploitability of Mexican migrant workers under the Bracero program
helped to entrench racist attitudes toward Mexicans in the areas of the United States where the
program operated.
231 Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 280 ("In the end, guest worker programs offer an ad hoc solution
to a persistent problem.").
232 See infra Part IV.B.
233 See Solomon, supra note 89.
234 See, e.g., Tomer Broude, The WO/GATS Mode 4, International Labor Migration Regimes and
Global Justice, INT'L L.F. 5 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 7-07 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=987315 ("[T]he GATS applies
only to labour-migration that is service related and does not establish free movement of yet
unemployed labour."). Professor Broude concludes "the GATS Mode 4 does not appear to be the
appropriate model" for the establishment of an international migration regime that is "morally
permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective." Id. at 31.
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In order to undermine the economic foundations of human trafficking,
labor must be brought front and center instead of being subsumed into other
inputs in production. None of the other proposals for addressing the
transnational labor market disequilibrium attempts to rethink and facilitate
the role of labor in economic activity. Furthermore, the proposals perpetuate
the fundamental source of the disequilibrium from which human trafficking
emerges: the interposition of the state between the human labor provider and
the economic stimuli to which the provider attempts to respond.
From the human rights perspective, the constraint of temporariness
counters the autonomy and agency of human labor providers, and is
fundamentally contradictory to the liberalization advocated in this Article.
From a political perspective, renegotiation of the GATS235 to broaden the
inclusiveness of its provisions presents such a difficulty that it is preferable
to aim for the most effective strategy, even though that strategy may be
equally difficult to achieve. Rather than tinkering with the GATS, which
addresses only "a subset of a subset of a subset" 236 of the transnational labor
market, this Article advocates that the difficult task of multilateral labor
liberalization should be unconstrained by temporal limitations on the
mobility of human labor providers.
IV. SOLUTION: MULTILATERAL LABOR LIBERALIZATION
Nobody is master of the world and I think that people should
be free to live where they want, there shouldn't be borders, we
have needs and they ought to give us our chance to be able to
earn enough to live . . . .But they return you, simply and
purely because they don't want you to stay.237
Restrictive immigration policies do not work to constrain the flow of
labor.238 Instead, they serve to facilitate the exploitation of the migrant and
235 See, e.g., Winters et al., supra note 97, at 1149; Bhatnagar, supra note 134.
236 See Solomon, supra note 89, at 111.
237 Peruvian domestic workers quoted in ANDERSON, supra note 121, at 33.
238 Anderson explains:
Immigration restrictions do not stop movement, and once migrants have
entered a country only a minority are deported. The difficulty with stringent
and restrictive immigration laws is that since they cannot stop migration,
they mean that migration is forced to come through irregular channels and
that state control over patterns and directions of migrant labour is
relinquished rather than increased. This is clearly apparent when one
contrasts Spain, where it is possible for domestic workers to enter legally,
with Greece and France, where this is not so.
Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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would-be migrant, 239 such that entire industries, both legitimate and illegal,
grow from lucrative and fruitless border enforcement.240
The fight against the modern traffic in humans would be enhanced by
recognizing labor's role in the international economic system and
acknowledging that, within the world trading system, labor (human capital)
should be given status analogous to other inputs into production, such as
capital and intellectual property. The comparative advantage of some
states-usually developing countries-is their abundance of available labor.
Individuals and organizations from those countries should be able to trade
their labor freely across borders within the institutional framework of the
GATT/WTO system. The negotiation and entry into force of a multilateral
agreement on trade in labor offers the prospect of achieving the goals of both
human rights-by successfully combating the trade in humans-and trade
liberalization-through the efficient use of economic resources with welfare-
enhancing effects.
Negotiation, execution, and entry into force of a General Agreement on
Trade in Labor would also demand reform of individual states' domestic
immigration laws to reflect economic needs and reality, as well as
enforcement of international human rights and domestic civil rights
standards. Further, this proposal demands no less than a holistic rethinking
of labor so that labor has the freedom to freely pursue economic goals in a
global market that recognizes and enforces fundamental human rights.
239 See, e.g., HAYTER, supra note 82, at xxv ("Suffering is an inevitable consequence of
immigration control.").
240 Verstraete provides an example:
[Niot only is border control a burden for private enterprises, it can also be a
gain. Lots of money is to be made in the implementation of strict borders,
ranging from high-tech surveillance systems to the deployment of security
guards to the deportation of illegal "aliens" by commercial airlines.
Furthermore, the harder the external border, the more attractive the
unofficial routes circumventing it. Smuggling people in has become a
lucrative business, and not only in the countries of departure. Since the
possibility of people migrating legally has become minimal, several European
truckers are getting rich through organized trafficking networks.
Verstraete, supra note 221, at 235.
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A. Re-Conceptualizing Labor
At some future point in world civilization, it may well be
discovered that the right to free and open movement of people
on the surface of the earth is fundamental to the structure of
human opportunity and is therefore basic in the same sense as
is free religion, speech, and the franchise.2 41
In Part III, this Article elaborated on the disjuncture and consequent
human exploitation that the gap between the rhetoric and reality of the
contemporary model of trade liberalization creates. Here, the Article explains
why a re-conceptualization of human labor is necessary.
The conceptual framework that permits human trafficking thrives within
the intersection of the conceptualization of labor and its providers purely as
commodities. The framework is evidenced by, for example, references to
"human capital" and the accepted premise that capital owes very little to
labor--evidenced in developed countries by movement away from pension
plans, toward mass layoffs, and away from healthcare plans for retirees. This
emphasis on cheapness, efficiency, increasing returns, and lower-cost inputs
could lead, at the extremes, to the conception of humans (and not only their
labor and its products) as trade objects.242
At the same time, and in contradiction, the absence of a general
agreement on trade in labor and the failure to recognize such a role for labor
in existing WTO arrangements convey the message that the multilateral
trading system eschews conferring on labor the status of a factor of
production. That message contradicts the existing economic reality. The
current system allows labor's exploitation as a factor of production while
denying labor full autonomy to explore economic opportunity. In order for
human labor to claim its proper place in the world trading system (equal to
the other mobile factors of production), and to enjoy the human rights
promised by the international human rights regime and by some domestic
civil rights regimes, labor must be recognized as an autonomous economic
unit and liberalized to perform as such.
This Article recognizes the fundamental moral, philosophical, and ethical
truth that labor is not merely a commodity. However, this Article seeks to
point out and to provide a solution that is based on the reality that, while
more than a unit of production or economic input, human labor providers are
also just that--economic units and factors of production. A holistic re-
conceptualization and implementation of that human role is absolutely
necessary to successfully combat human trafficking and other forms of
profitable human-to-human exploitation.
241 Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People on
the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 218 (1971).
242 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 142, at 28 (articulating the view that guestworker programs lead
to the commodification of the worker).
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Some have questioned whether the trade law regime is inconsistent with
human rights.243 A thorough response to this question is outside the scope of
this Article, but the Article identifies as a contributing factor the gaps in
conceptualization of humans under human rights law and under
international trade law. Neither international human rights law nor
international trade law recognizes or implements the full array of human
attributes. Consequently, while under human rights law the individual is
more than an economic unit, under domestic immigration law human labor
providers are treated as economic units (often in contravention of human
rights law) 244 and the same is true, implicitly, under international trade
law.245 In fact, the international trade system treats and relies upon humans
as functioning economic units-producers and consumers 246-without
explicitly recognizing and implementing the necessary steps for their
liberalization.
B. General Agreement on Trade in Labor
In order to attack the structural foundations of human trafficking, the
transnational economic disequilibrium that facilitates this exploitation must
be addressed. The most appropriate mechanism for this task is the
establishment of full labor mobility in a cosmopolitan mode. This Article's
proposed liberalization of labor would make both the international human
rights and multilateral trade regimes more consistent with human rights
ideals. Liberalization of the movement of labor will give labor more economic
power-the ability to respond freely and autonomously to economic
243 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human
Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51, 64-76 (1999) (discussing the apparent and seemingly
inherent conflict between market globalization and human rights). Professor Garcia rejects the
conflict, however, noting that "[t]he linkage debates currently underway in trade law and policy
reveal to us that international economic law is fundamentally about justice, as are human rights
law and other linkage issues." Id. at 95-96.
244 Anderson explains the tension:
The migrant worker is framed by immigration legislation as a unit of labour,
without connection to family or friends, a unit whose production costs (food,
education, shelter) were met elsewhere, and whose reproduction costs are of
no concern to employer or state. In this respect, the worker who moves across
continents may seem the logical result of capitalism's individual subject, the
juridical person, torn from all social contexts, selling her labour power in the
global market place. But while states and capitalists want workers, what
they get is people. This tension between 'labour power' and 'personhood' is
particularly striking with reference to migrant domestic workers, and I
believe it has broader repercussion for migrants and for women.
ANDERSON, supra note 121, at 108.
245 The four Modes of the GATS implicitly recognize that role, whereby humans provide labor
service under Modes 3 and 4. See supra Part II.B.1.
246 For example, a central tenet of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence is based on the notion of
consumer choice, that is, humans as the creators of economic trends and competitive realities in
their role as consumers.
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conditions. Further, the right to enter and exit competing domestic labor
markets will exert pressure, creating competitive conditions and market
discipline that will enhance the recognition and enforcement of labor and
other human rights standards. That ability of the human labor provider will
add substantive content to human rights in a manner that a static population
currently cannot achieve. 247 As a result, labor liberalization will foster the
enforcement of human rights.
Additionally, movement of labor providers from today's labor-rich
countries would not exhibit the exploitative features of mass labor
movements of the colonial era. 248 Contemporary international human rights
and domestic civil rights laws provide a baseline of minimum treatment that
did not exist in the colonial era. 249 The liberalization of labor will enhance the
capacity to implement and enforce that baseline of minimum standards
within competing domestic markets. Moreover, the baseline must be enforced
through renewed implementation of existing monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms aimed at upholding human rights standards. The application of
credible enforcement standards, in particular, would invigorate this process.
The relationship is symbiotic-liberalization would not enhance enforcement
in the absence of a baseline of recognition and enforcement of full
personhood; without liberalization the baseline is inadequately enforced.
The baseline is, in large part, embodied in the four dominant anti-
trafficking conceptual and legal frameworks discussed in Part II. The
structural economic- and trade-based solution offered here can succeed only if
coordinated with enforcement and entrenchment of the dominant
frameworks' anti-trafficking norms and mechanisms. This Article's structural
liberalization framework seeks to decrease or eliminate vulnerability to
trafficking. However, where such exploitation does take place, the trafficked
persons' rights must be vindicated, and the trafficker prosecuted.
There is some ironic justice in the proposed labor liberalization solution.
It may produce a flow of labor opposite to that of the colonial era. Instead of
the European movement outward to facilitate the development and
industrialization of Western economies, it may produce a movement from
former colonies to those Western economies. 250 The prerequisites for growth
of the formerly colonized territories and the world economy demand the
liberalization of labor. The General Agreement on Trade in Labor ("GATL")
would acknowledge the roles of human labor in transnational trade and
provide meaningful global autonomy to the individual human labor provider.
247 That is, the power to exit will impose market discipline on would-be autocrats seeking to
oppress the populations within their national borders.
248 For example, indentured servants moved from India to the West Indies, Fiji, and Africa
within the British colonial empire. See INDIAN INDENTURED, supra note 138.
249 Examples include human rights recognized and obligations assumed by states under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR.
250 See MASSEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 91-92, 95-96.
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1. Rationale
The new GATL would create a framework for recognition and increasing
liberalization of labor under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
('WTO"). As envisaged here, the GATL would be negotiated and adopted as a
new Annex to the WTO Agreement-a multilateral agreement creating
obligations for all members of the WTO. 251 Similar to the TRIPS and the
GATS, a transitional period would be applied to accession by WTO developing
and least-developed members.
By advocating a new GATL, analogous to the GATS and the TRIPS and
having equal force, this Article rejects the dominant conceptualization of the
role of human labor in the international trading system. It also rejects the
piecemeal approach of gradual expansion of Mode 4 of the GATS because that
approach is inadequate to this Article's goal of undermining the economic
foundations of human trafficking through transnational labor
liberalization. 252 The proposal also brings to the fore and gives substance to
an attribute of labor that is crucial to combating the traffic in humans-
labor's transnational mobility.
Inherent in this Article's advocacy of a multilateral instrument is the
view that regional experiments with labor liberalization are transitional. The
multilateral trading system incorporates domestic economies into a global
economy. The economic forces that stimulate dislocations and the responsive
movement of human labor providers are global in scope. Experiments within
regional trade arrangements will contribute knowledge and experience
toward building a multilateral legal framework. However, labor must be
liberalized to act globally in response to global economic forces.
The GATL would un-tether the transnational trade in labor from the
constraints of Mode 4, including the mandated temporariness of the
transborder labor movement contemplated by Mode 4.253 It would also un-
tether human movement from the irrational nativist constraints of domestic
immigration laws that too often lay the foundation for exploitation, of which
human trafficking is but one extreme example.
2. Why the WTO?
The GATT/WTO framework is the most appropriate venue for
effectuating this transformation. It might appear that the principle of labor
liberalization or labor mobility might be addressed more appropriately under
the auspices of some alternative international regime, such as human
251 Status as a plurilateral agreement, in which participation would be optional for WTO member
states, would not achieve the purposes sought through this agreement.
252 See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C.
253 As discussed in supra Part III.A., the constraint of temporariness is a key source of
exploitability and vulnerability for human transborder labor providers.
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rights 25 4 or labor rights. 25 5 However, both of those regimes have proved and
will continue to prove unable to implement the principle of the liberalization
of labor as a factor of production, so that labor may act as an autonomous
economic unit in the world trading system.
Perhaps even more persuasive is the fact that the explicit incorporation of
labor into the multilateral trading system would coincide with the vision of
the original drafters of the Havana International Trade Organization Charter
("ITO Charter"). The ITO Charter would have created the (stillborn)
International Trade Organization 25 6 whose provisions were intended to
supersede the provisions of the 1947 GATT (the original instrument of
multilateral trade liberalization). 25 7 The instrument included several
provisions that addressed labor standards and employment issues as an
essential part of multilateral trade liberalization. 255
Not only does labor liberalization sit squarely within the trade
liberalization raison d'6tre of the WTO, the equity rationale of the
GATT/WTO system 259 also speaks in favor of utilizing the WTO's
institutional framework to further the liberalization of labor. According to
Charnovitz, certain features of the WTO institutional and treaty obligation
framework-such as "special and differential treatment," 260 and almost
certainly, the longer transitional periods for least developed countries-
indicate the existence of the equity rationale. As such, the WTO provides an
appropriate framework for the mechanism of labor liberalization-a
mechanism aimed at combating human trafficking by more widely
disseminating the benefits of trade liberalization. 261
Further, the GATL, as part of the GATTIWTO system, would offer the
advantage of the flexibility incorporated within that framework. Within the
254 Labor liberalization may be better addressed in the human rights regime by, for example,
expansion of the recognition of the individual right to freedom of movement.
255 The International Labor Organization ("ILO") is one example of an alternative international
regime that may more appropriately address labor liberalization.
256 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 88, at 1-3.
257 Id. at 2.
255 See, e.g., ITO (Havana) Charter arts. 2 (Importance of Employment, Production and Demand
in Relation to the Purpose of this Charter), 3 (Maintenance of Domestic Employment), reprinted
in RA BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2001).
259 As identified by Charnovitz, for example. See Charnovitz, supra note 96, at 242 ("The equity
rationale for the WTO is further justification for reducing barriers to the movement of people.").
260 GATT Part IV and a number of the Annexes to the WTO Agreement (TRIPS and TRIMS, for
example) provide for special and different treatment between the legal obligations of WTO
member states. The distinction, which is based on the development status of member states,
provides certain legal advantages to developing and less developed countries, without triggering
the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT/WTO system.
261 See Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 7, at 110 (arguing that labor
liberalization will democratize access to the benefits of trade liberalization).
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overarching obligations and principles negotiated by the member states, the
commitments made by individual members may be tailored to individual
states' circumstances so as to slow down or speed up the transitional
challenges anticipated from the liberalization of labor.
The GATT/WTO system offers the power to sanction, a power that is
missing from both the general human rights and labor rights regimes. 262 The
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes 263 of the GATT/WTO system offers an avenue for effective mutual
member state enforcement of GATT/WTO obligations. Finally, as this Article
advocates for the recognition and implementation of labor's role in the global
trading system, it is appropriate that such recognition and implementation
be incorporated into the treaty architecture of the existing multilateral
trading regime.
3. Principal Provisions
This Article offers a preliminary structure for the GATL, but will not
provide a fully drafted example of the proposed treaty. 264 Instead, some
necessary provisions will be discussed. Some of the key provisions that are
fundamental to the functioning of the GATL and the implementation of the
labor liberalization that it would put in motion include: elaboration of the
fundamental obligations of WTO members; recognition of the applicability of
the nondiscrimination provisions already employed within the GATT/WTO
system; and enumeration of permitted exceptions to the overarching
obligation. 265
Elaboration of the member state obligations would include language that
provides for a commitment on the part of member states to the principle that
labor should be liberalized to respond to transborder economic forces. It
would also allow access to the domestic labor markets of member states.
Crucially, the provisions would make clear that member states would not
262 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
263 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994).
264 In his new book advocating labor mobility, leading international trade scholar, Joel
Trachtman, proposes and drafts a model labor liberalization agreement. See JOEL P.
TRACHTMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION: TOWARD THE FOURTH
FREEDOM (2009). For another example of a proposal to liberalize labor, see also World Comm'n
on the Social Dimension of Globalization Proposal: General Agreement on Movement of People,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/idea/ideasheet.display?p-ideaid=21 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
265 This enumeration would be key in order to avoid the evisceration of the obligation to liberalize
labor through, for example, application of the National Security exceptions of Article XXI of the
GATT. Despite the nondiscrimination obligations that prohibit more favorable treatment on the
basis of country of origin (National Treatment and Most Favored Nation), GATT 1947 creates
exceptions to member states' obligations, including protection of national security, health of
plants, animals and humans, and public morals. See also infra notes 266-271 and accompanying
text.
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impose temporal constraints on the transborder movement of labor, but
instead would allow human labor providers to respond freely to changing
labor markets and other economic stimuli. Second, the GATL's recognition of
the established nondiscrimination doctrines would expressly invoke both the
national treatment and most favored nation obligations. 266
Third, the provisions governing exceptions applicable to the principle of
labor liberalization would be crucial. The GATT and the multilateral
266 Article I of the GATT 1947 spells out the Most Favored Nation obligations of member states.
Article 1:1 specifies that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method
of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and
formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT 1947 art. I.
Article III of the GATT 1947 lays out the National Treatment obligation. Article 111:1-2 and 4
specify that:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GATT 1947 art. III. These provisions are echoed in the GATS and the TRIPS. For details, see
Articles II (Most Favored Nation) and XVII (National Treatment) of the GATS and Articles 3
(National Treatment) and 4 (Most Favored Nation) of the TRIPS. But see Broude, supra note 234
(arguing that the applicability of National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Obligations are
barriers to liberal migration because they undermine state incentives to allow increased access).
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agreements previously referenced in this Article provide for a number of
exceptions to the application of their trade liberalization provisions. Those
exceptions include, for example, anti-dumping provisions, 267 health and
safety of humans, plants, and animals, 268 and national security, 269 among
others. 270 In order to provide for the full implementation of the GATL, the
provisions of that agreement would need to specify the applicability of
existing exceptions, including the non-applicability of some of those
provisions, 271 as well as interpretive guidelines governing the application of
allowed exceptions. 272
In addition, the GATL and its interpretation will be subject to existing
GATT/WTO jurisprudence and to nondiscriminatory criminal and other
public order legal regimes of individual member states. Member states would
not be obligated to allow the entry of individual labor providers who intend to
participate in illegal and/or illegitimate endeavors. For example, the GATL
would not require the entry of individual labor providers destined for the
illegal sex trade or other industries that are illegal under the laws of the host
member state. In addition, activities that are malum in se, such as the
movement of underage children for sexual or other types of exploitation,
would not be facilitated by the provisions of the GATL.
Professor Kevin R. Johnson, in advocating an open border policy for U.S.
domestic immigration laws, 273 has specified a number of potential limitations
on that policy. These include restrictions on the entry of individuals based on
threats to health and safety, prior criminality, and state security (e.g.,
terrorism). 274 The restrictions that Professor Johnson proposes provide a good
starting point for the negotiation of exceptions that would be applicable to the
multilateral obligation to liberalize labor.
In confronting non-tariff barriers to the liberalization of labor, the GATL
would need to address areas such as the transferability of national
267 GATT 1947 art. VI; Multilateral Trade Agreements on Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). Anti-dumping mechanisms allow a state to take action to protect
its economy and producers against the sale of products in its domestic markets at below
production cost. See, e.g., BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 88, at 649-51.
268 GATT 1947 art. XX(b).
269 Id. art. XXI.
270 See generally id. art. XX (General Exceptions).
271 For example, the "public morals" exception of Article XX(a) of GATT 1947 may lead to the
construction of barriers to entry that may, in fact, be rooted in xenophobic sentiments. GATT
1947 art. XX(a).
272 In the absence of such restraints, the domestic markets of individual member states might be
re-structured in reaction to liberalization so as to give preference to the member states' citizens.
273 See generally JOHNSON, supra note 110 (calling for a fundamental reconceptualization of U.S.
immigration policies and laws).
274 Id. at 37.
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educational and professional credentials, recognition of such credentials, and
mechanisms for credentialing. Among existing regional trade arrangements,
the European Union has gone furthest on the path of free movement of labor
among member state nationals. Thus, the EU model would provide some
guidance. Federal states, such as the United States, also have considerable
expertise in the credentialing of professionals across internal state borders.
The GATL would also need to address the interaction of credentialing with
health and safety concerns (in the medical professions, for example) and
circumvent the consequent temptation and opportunity for protectionist
maneuvering.
Finally, the GATL should address the applicability of dumping and anti-
dumping provisions. It is foreseeable that the entry of a large number of
workers with specific skill sets, who accept lower wages than is the norm in a
particular domestic market, might give rise to dumping charges and anti-
dumping action by the receiving (host) state. The interaction of domestic
labor standards and state obligations to enforce standards, including
applicable minimum wage provisions, would be crucial to the functioning and
implementation of the GATL and to the prevention of the negative effects of
such "unfair competition" on domestic labor providers.
While the foregoing summary is an incomplete outline of the types of
issues that the GATL must address, it identifies the key mechanisms
necessary to enshrine the principle that labor should be free to respond to
transborder market forces. At the same time, it leaves to member states of
the WTO and their negotiators the task of shading in subtleties of
implementation without eviscerating the fundamental obligation to liberalize
labor.275
C. Anticipated Critiques and Responses
This Article employs an economics-based and trade-inspired lens that is
not usually applied to the trafficking of human beings. Further, the solution
proffered here, which is aimed at combating and undermining the economic
pillars of modern human trafficking, appears to require radical rethinking
and reorganizing of transnational and international relationships. As a
consequence, the critiques of this proposal will be many and heartfelt. They
will include accusations of overkill and inadequacy, conflict with human
rights norms, challenges to and severe disruption of nation states and their
sovereignty through floods of individual human labor providers from labor-
rich to labor-poor states, and lack of political will, among others. The Article
responds below to some fundamental arguments that will be advanced to
contest the liberalization of labor, but argues that such counterarguments do
not negate the analytical framework and proposal explored here. The
275 A key issue is the question whether developing and less developed countries will negotiate for
the transitional application of the GATL obligations, analogous to the transitional application of
the TRIPS Agreement, for example.
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responses outlined in this Article are by no means complete, but each of the
foregoing critiques is addressed below.
1. Inadequacy
This Article's analysis of the economic foundations of human trafficking
is subject to the critique of inadequacy. That is, in evaluating the economic
pillars of human trafficking, the discussion has focused on the supply side
rather than the demand aspect of human trafficking. Given that lens, is the
solution proposed here subject to the critique leveled against the War on
Drugs and the attempted interdiction of other illicit substances?
The critique of a supply-side focus is not completely accurate. While
primarily focused on the obstructed supply of individual human labor
providers, the analysis has explicitly acknowledged the demand for cheaper
labor. Indeed, this Article claims that demand for cheaper labor has led to the
involvement in and framing of the transnational labor market by nation
states, capital, and human suppliers. 276 However, this Article is based on the
central thesis that, whatever the existing and future demands may be for
human-to-human exploitation, it is the vulnerability of human labor
providers to that demand that allows human trafficking to flourish. The
pedophile or the consumer of cheap labor would demand their desired human
merchandise in vain if the supply of such would-be victims were limited
through deployment and harnessing of economic forces. Further, this Article
does not claim that human nature will discontinue its tendency toward
exploitative relations-incidents of such exploitation will continue. However,
by eliminating or severely decreasing the potential supply, human trafficking
can be re-made into the aberrational practice that anti-trafficking discourse
now pretends that it already is. 277
The supply focus of this Article's proposed solution differs fundamentally
from that employed in the War on Drugs. The War on Drugs attempts to end
the consumption of illicit and illegal substances by stamping out the supply,
and thus destroy the market for those substances. This Article does not
propose to end the transnational labor market; instead, it proposes that the
flow of human labor providers be liberalized and that the transnational scope
276 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1-III.A.3.
277 The expressions of horror about "shocking" examples of human trafficking serve to mask the
reality that such exploitation is, for too many, purely quotidian. Furthermore, such exploitation
is all too frequently integrated in the 'legitimate" economy. For example, child slaves may have
picked the cocoa used to make high-end chocolate products; and onions available at the
neighborhood grocer's may have been produced by exploited migrant labor. See U.S. STATE DEP'T,
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 142, (2009) (describing trafficking of children in Ghana for
labor on cocoa farms); Child Labor Coalition, Children in the Fields: The Inequitable Treatment
of Child Farmworkers, http://www.stopchildlabor.org/Consumercampaignsfields.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 2009) (describing, among other things, harvesting of onions by children as young
as nine and 10 in Batesville, Texas).
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of the market be openly recognized and facilitated under the legal framework
of multilateral trade liberalization.
2. Overkill
The critique of overkill appears to be an obvious one. In view of the many
forms of existing human rights violations, crimes, and global challenges, how
and why would the traffic in human beings merit a response as disruptive
and transformative as the multilateral liberalization of labor?
Human trafficking is an extreme form of endemic human-to-human
exploitation. The economic forces and realities that give rise to the modern
traffic in human beings also underlie other forms of exploitation, including
labor exploitation and the hardships of migrant smuggling. The economic and
trade-based solution that this Article advocates would result in multi-
pronged benefits. 278 The resulting economic autonomy of individual humans
would serve to decrease the vulnerability to human trafficking of far-flung
individuals and groups as well as their vulnerability to those other violations.
Although this Article's labor liberalization solution aims at the trafficking in
humans-an extreme form of human-to-human exploitation-the
ameliorative power of the transformative force of labor liberalization will also
target other kinds of human rights violations. 279
3. Floodgates
Another expected critique is the prospect of floods of migrants. If national
borders may be legally and openly traversed, then unstoppable floods of
economic migrants will overwhelm the domestic markets of the nation states
that promise economic opportunity.
There will be a disruptive transition, but there are built-in checks to
human movement even in the case of full labor liberalization. 28 0 These range
from the economic costs of movement-not everyone will be able to afford to
undertake transborder movement (even when costs are lowered as a
consequence of liberalization) 28 1-to emotional and other psychological bonds
278 Walters, supra note 99, at 93 ("Increasing global labor mobility has greater potential to
benefit world wide development, peace, and prosperity than any other kind of reform."). See also
id. at 94-97.
279 Think, for example, of the power of exit. If individual humans have the power to exit from
exploitative conditions, with assurance that the new condition will be less exploitative, the
prospect of losing population or of competing for population will increase the incentive of states
to ameliorate exploitative conditions in their domestic markets.
280 As a result of the built-in checks, the liberalization of labor may have a less disruptive impact
than does the liberalization of capital. See Walters, supra note 99, at 100.
281 HAYTER, supra note 82, at 154:
Most people cannot afford the fares, the loss of earnings when moving, and
the expense of settling in a new country. Others might prefer to migrate for
short periods, while they are young and strong, and to return when they have
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to an individual's place of origin. 28 2 Such bonds include attachment to a
particular environment or lifestyle or to individuals or groups who may not
easily move. 28 3 Other economic factors include the reality that either upward
or downward equalization of remuneration for labor will decrease the
incentive of individual labor providers to move from even traditional sending
states. 28 4 In addition, the recipients of remittances may be less inclined to
leave their home state as the benefits of higher compensation are transferred
to the home state and can be enjoyed by recipients in the state of origin. Note,
however, that the built-in economic check may be less effective if there is too
wide a disparity between the living conditions in the sending state and those
anticipated in the receiving state.285
The ability to exit, created by the lowering of barriers to entry into
potential host states, will fundamentally transform the relationship between
labor and capital. 28 6 If states must openly compete for human labor and
populace, that competition will affect the economic policies of sending states.
Faced with the prospect of losing their populations, such sending states may
choose to reform and more equitably distribute domestic resources to the
entrenched have-nots instead of solely to the owners of capital.287 However,
saved enough or learnt enough without losing the possibility of migrating
again and without being forced to settle and to move their families.
Id.
282 See, e.g., R. George Wright, Federal Immigration Law and the Case for Open Entry, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1265, 1280-81 (1994) (discussing the reluctance of "most people" to leave their
countries of origin).
283 HAYTER, supra note 82, at 154 ("On the whole most people do not want to uproot themselves,
abandon their families, and suffer the hardships and risks of migration to a strange and possibly
hostile place in order to do the dirty work of the natives. And . . . they like their own countries
and cultures.").
284 Think of the example of Ireland, a traditional sending state. As economic conditions improved,
descendants of prior waves of emigrants as well as immigrants from new sending states flocked
to the opportunities offered by Ireland's booming domestic economy. See, e.g., MARTIN RUHS,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., IRELAND: FROM RAPID IMMIGRATION TO RECESSION (2009),
http://www.migrationinformation.orgfProfiles/display.cfm?id=260.
285 That is, if there is a wide disparity in living conditions there may be a greater incentive to
move. However, labor liberalization will cause states to compete for population, thus encouraging
improvements in living conditions, including economic conditions, and the civil and human rights
that are recognized and enforced within domestic markets.
286 The liberalization of labor outlined here does not require that potential host states must
provide financial or other assistance to facilitate the entry or exit of transborder labor providers.
The costs of transborder labor movement will be lowered by the removal of the middlemen who
now provide services to facilitate unsanctioned entry or to navigate bureaucratic barriers to
entry. Some economic barriers to entry will persist, however, based on an inability to pay
transportation and other costs. These persistent costs, together with the other factors discussed
in this subsection, will contribute to the built-in checks to the "threat" of opened floodgates.
287 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalism's Discontents, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002 (discussing the
market discipline that would be introduced and maintained by the ability of skilled workers to
respond freely to transnational market stimuli). However, Stiglitz addresses the movement of
skilled workers only. Id.
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some intransigent authoritarian regimes may view exit by their nationals as
a convenient mechanism for siphoning away potential dissenters.
Other built-in checks include the possibility of reverse migration. Human
labor providers in traditional receiving states might find it very attractive to
move, whether temporarily or permanently, to a traditional sending state for
lifestyle and other reasons. 288 Their presence, together with the skills
brought home by returnees, would bring benefits such as the transfer of
skills, capital, ideas, and culture with potentially transformative economic
impact. In turn, the effect of stimulated economic opportunity in the domestic
economies of traditional sending states would decrease the incentive of
individual human labor providers to leave. 28 9
4. -Isms and Schisms 290
This Article's proposed solution to liberalize labor employs the rhetoric of
the autonomous economic human actor. However, questions arise with
respect to the impact on the autonomy of the individual mobile labor provider
of endemic racism, sexism, and other "isms" in the receiving states. This
critique is based on an appreciation of the human tendency to create "in" and
"out" groups: the tendency to de-humanize (or at least fear and despise) the
"other" based on real or perceived differences, and on the other's perceived
inferiority and/or powerlessness. Would the increased movement of labor lead
to greater exploitation of the mobile "other" in the course of transit and in the
receiving state, instead of decreasing the individual's vulnerability to
exploitation?
In order for labor liberalization to be most effective, it should take place
within a context that recognizes and enforces human rights standards. The
mobile individual human labor provider would enjoy the human rights
protections of the applicable domestic and international legal regimes on the
288 A robust transnational movement of retirees from receiving to sending states already exists.
Examples include U.S. citizens to Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, and other states with more
temperate climates. See, e.g., David Dixon, Julie Murray, & Julia Gelatt, America's Emigrants:
U.S. Retirement Migration to Mexico and Panama, MIGRATION POLICY INST., Sept. 2006,
available at http://www.migrationinformation.orgUsfocus/display.cfm?ID=416; see also Jeremy
Schwartz, U.S. Retirees Flock South of the Border, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Sept. 14, 2008,
available at http://www.venturacountystar.comlnews/2008/sep/14/us-retirees-flock-to-south-of-
the-border/.
289 See JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 28-29. See also TUNcAY GULOGLU & GOKHAN GUDER, THE
ENLARGEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION AND LABOR MARKET: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 8 (Cornell
University ILR School Visiting Fellow Series, (2005)), available at http://digital
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/intlvf/8/ ("Spanish and Portuguese enlargements show that people tend
to stay in their own countries especially if the [home country] begins to experience of [sic]
economic recovery and growth.").
290 BOB MARLEY, GET UP STAND Up, available at http://www.lyricsfreak.comblbob+marley/
get+up+stand+up_20021743.html ("we sick and tired of your ism-skism [sic] game").
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same basis as the domestic human labor provider. 291 Further, the declining
information asymmetries will allow human labor providers to learn of and
respond to economic conditions, and to avoid domestic labor markets where
exploitative conditions, sexism, racism, and other "isms" are prevalent.
The contemporary human rights framework may not be suited perfectly
to the introduction of the transformative mechanism of labor liberalization. It
is unlikely that such perfect timing may ever eventuate. The benefits
anticipated from labor liberalization cannot wait for the perfect moment that
may never arrive. Further, this Article argues that this very mechanism,
labor liberalization, will give rise to greater recognition and enforcement of
human rights. 292
5. Sending State Perspectives
Would labor liberalization lead to declining economic wellbeing of sending
states? Will such states not have an adverse reaction to this proposal, which
suggests the loss of population, brain drain, and a loss of control over the
remaining population?
Traditional sending countries already provide human labor to the
transnational labor market. Indeed, some sending countries themselves
actively engage in trading their nationals' labor on the transnational labor
market. 293 The ability of more of those nationals to access the transnational
labor market, and to do so without violating the domestic laws of receiving
states, will enable the sending country governments to better protect the
rights of their nationals abroad and to decrease those nationals' vulnerability
to exploitation.
Further, within individual sending countries, the transfer of remittances
from liberalized labor and the inflow of skills, new technologies, and new
ways of economic endeavor will stimulate economies and widen the
distribution of the benefits of trade liberalization and globalization. 294 Fears
that labor liberalization would lead to an increase in the brain drain that is
already affecting traditional sending countries can be mitigated through the
deployment of preventive and ameliorative mechanisms. These include the
transnational enforcement of obligations to repay (with interest) the costs of
state-funded overseas higher education or the guarantee of transitional
291 Here, Professor Jennifer Gordon's concept of transnational labor citizenship would play a
crucial role in maintaining transborder legal standards. See Gordon, supra note 191, at 561-78
(supporting transnational labor mobility conditioned upon migrant labor's commitment not to
undermine the labor standards of host state economies).
292 See discussion supra Part N.A.
293 See the above discussion of Pakistan's and the Philippines' participation in the transnational
labor market. Part III.A.l.c. & d.
294 Winters et al., supra note 97, at 1142 (stating that "[tiemporary workers abroad are likely to
be a source of ideas, technology, markets or networks for those who remain, increasing their
productivity and opportunities").
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above-market rate salaries and benefits to returning labor providers.
Further, the facilitation of entry and exit will decrease the rates of
permanent migration as movement between home and host states is
normalized. The mobile human labor provider would no longer fear that a
would-be temporary exit from the host state would lead to a permanent bar to
reentry.
6. Receiving State Perspectives
Another potential challenge to the proposed mechanism of labor
liberalization arises from the question of whether, while receiving states will
gain the economic benefits of cheaper labor and avoidance of labor shortages,
the cost of labor liberalization will be too high. Such costs would stem, for
example, from the obligation to provide social entitlements to the migrant
human labor provider. Such a prospective increase in costs would give
national leaders pause.
However, it is possible to structure labor liberalization so as to minimize
those costs. For example, access to social entitlements could be phased in by
tying them to the length of time that the migrant labor provider has worked
in the receiving state. Further, the increase in labor supply, the consumption
patterns, and the demands of such migrant laborers will have an economic
impact that will increase the contributions to government coffers from
sources such as payroll contributions to social programs, payroll taxes, and
consumption/retail taxes. 295 In addition, the consumption and migration
pattern is such that young, healthy, migrant laborers infrequently access
healthcare and other services of receiving states. 296
Further, labor shortages and wage disparities in competing domestic
markets create incentives for capital to relocate production and other
facilities away from high-wage domestic markets. The availability of
additional labor in these states and transnational wage equalization will
reverse that incentive so that production facilities will be less likely to re-
295 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice, and
Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 763 (2003) (discussing reasons why immigrants'
impact on domestic labor's wages and employment is not more negative: "One reason is that the
demand for labor does not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant workers
not only supply labor, for example, they also demand goods and services, and this demand will
translate into greater demand for locally supplied labor."). See also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE
LAw AND ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 8 (2003):
An offsetting increase in the demand for labour is in fact quite plausible,
since immigrants are consumers of goods and services, and the increased
demand for and provision of goods and services inevitably associated with
their presence ought to result in a corresponding increase in labour demand
by domestic suppliers of goods and services.
Id.
296 See, e.g., Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, Social Security Benefits of Immigrants
and U.S. Born, in ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION 309-50 (George J. Borjas ed.,
2000).
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locate purely for the purpose of arbitrating wage differentials. Migrant labor
access to the same human and civil rights as domestic labor is crucial if such
standards are to be enforced.
Through multilateral labor liberalization, receiving states can resolve the
dichotomy between the economic reality of their labor market and their
protectionist domestic social and political sentiments. In addition, labor
liberalization that protects the human dignity of human labor providers will
close the gap between the liberal human rights ideals of many of those
societies and the reality of the human exploitation that the restrictive
immigration and right-to-work policies those same societies facilitate.
7. Lack of Political Will
The liberalization of labor may have transformative effects on the current
political and economic structure of both participating and nonparticipating
states. Political resistance to such changes can be expected from national
governments, entrenched interests that fear loss of power and influence,
some categories of capital that might lose the ability to price-discriminate in
labor compensation rates, and the populations of both sending and receiving
states who fear changes to their way of life.
Nor would the resistance to the GATL be limited to the domestic politics
of individual member states. The continuing failure of the WTO Doha
Development Round of negotiations 297 strongly suggests that, as presently
constituted, the WTO may have reached an impasse in the multilateral trade
liberalization project.298 However, it is possible that the member states whose
interests have prevented resolution of agricultural subsidy issues at the heart
of the Doha negotiation challenges 299 would adopt different and more
welcoming positions toward the prospect of liberalizing labor. 300
Honest conversations and a long-term viewpoint about the expected
benefits would help to overcome the reluctance. Also essential is a
transnational perspective that transcends local and domestic interests and
encompasses global concerns. 30 1
297 See, e.g., Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al.
298 See Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOY. UNI. CHIC. INT'L
L. REV. Part VIII (4 Qs Plus Faith in a Resurrection) (forthcoming 2009).
299 See, e.g., Stephen Castle & Keith Bradsher, China Key to Deadlock Over Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2008, at Al.
3w Both developed and developing countries are projected to benefit from labor liberalization. See
Winters et al., supra note 97 and accompanying text; Kategekwa, supra note 100.
301 See Bravo, Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 7, at 113 (discussing the need for a
transformed globalltransnational viewpoint and extreme political courage when embarking on
labor liberalization policies even within the more limited context of regional trade
arrangements).
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8. Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis, which emerged in the latter half of 2008, may
lead to additional critiques of this Article's prescription. The crisis has
highlighted the transnational economic interdependence of states and,
perhaps, a perception that the domestic economic turmoil stems from that
interdependence. That proven interdependence strengthens, rather than
weakens, this Article's analysis and the prescription that it offers.
Facilitating the movement of mobile labor in response to economic incentives
will improve the prospects for economic recovery in interdependent domestic
markets. 30 2
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes the deployment of free market and trade
liberalization principles to help resolve a human rights nightmare. It
proposes that the fight against the modern traffic in humans would be
enhanced by a re-conceptualization of labor's role in the international
economic system. In so doing, this Article uses trade liberalization concepts to
argue that human capital be given a status similar to that conferred on
capital and intellectual property by international trade law. The comparative
advantage of some countries, usually developing countries, is their
abundance of available labor; individuals and organizations from those
countries should be able to trade their labor freely internationally within the
institutional framework of the GATT/WTO system. If the contemporary trade
liberalization model and the form of globalization that it stimulates are not to
be viewed as purely creatures of state entities and of corporate enterprises,
the forces untapped by globa]ization must benefit both natural and juridical
persons-both capital and labor.
In addition to suggesting a new, structural mechanism for combating
modern trafficking in human beings, this Article's prescription attempts to
facilitate the agency of individual human labor providers and to increase
their ability to respond to market forces in order to decrease their
vulnerability to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation. The
proposal would liberalize labor multilaterally under the auspices of the WTO
and thereby confer legally recognized and enforceable autonomy (true
freedom of movement) to individual labor providers who seek to respond to
transborder market forces. The proposed multilateral annex to the WTO
Agreement, a General Agreement on Trade in Labor, would provide a
mechanism for negotiation of the gradual liberalization of the trade in labor.
Individual labor providers would be allowed to trade their labor freely across
borders for their own benefit pursuant to the dictates of the market, much as
the providers of goods and services already do.
302 The Obama Administration has rejected the isolationism that proved disastrous in the 1930s.
Cheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Makes Overtures to Canada Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2009, at A10.
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Labor must be liberalized to add to the array of weapons deployed against
human trafficking. Human labor providers are economic actors and economic
resources, just like state and profit-seeking juridical entities. Liberalized and
legal movement will eliminate the need for labor-providing individuals to
resort to smugglers and traffickers as a means of access to transborder labor
trading opportunities. Liberalized labor would be a self-owned resource, no
longer relegated to relatively passive economic exploitation by other entities.
Further, the liberalization of labor would integrate labor-rich economies into
the global economy while according more choices for labor providers as
autonomous economic actors. The integration of labor-rich and labor-poor
economies will facilitate and democratize access to economic opportunities,
rather than impede the economic forces unleashed by globalization.
Political, economic, and rights-based counterarguments will be proffered
to oppose the liberalization of labor, including the question of whether the
implementation of the proposal would be an overreaction to the traffic in
humans. Some moral and ethical questions also will arise regarding whether
the proposal to liberalize labor would lead to the commoditization of persons
such that the trade in humans would become a state-sanctioned phenomenon,
worsening the exploitation of individual labor providers. With the adoption of
adequate safeguards, such as the transnational labor citizenship program
proposed by Professor Jennifer Gordon, 30 3 the implementation of multilateral
labor liberalization will enhance individual autonomy and decrease
vulnerability to exploitation, including human trafficking.
The time frame for implementation of this proposed solution no doubt has
a long horizon. However, to eliminate (or, at the very least, to substantially
constrain) trafficking in human beings, the economic foundations of this
industry must be undermined as proposed by this Article.
303 See Gordon, supra note 191.
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